Sunday, May 25, 2014
High Hopes for Poroshenko
Acknowledging that I do not want this blog to devolve into a singular purpose Ukrainian crisis digest, I simply want to assert that Petro Poroshenko's win in Ukraine's presidential elections seems like it should restore a substantial degree of stability to the country in the face of its ongoing political crisis. I argued previously that the victory of the Euromaidan revolution against theYanukovych government would indisputably lead to the division of Ukraine. I am going to maintain this position - I cannot see Donetsk, Lugansk, and Kharkiiv oblasts playing ball with Poroshenko, with or without Moscow's blessing for the new Ukrainian government, unless the new government starts making concessions on linguistic policy (i.e. not pushing Ukrainian too hard down the throats of majority Russian speakers) and economic developmental planning (allowing local policy makers in the Don Basin a relatively free hand in negotiating with the Russian Federation and with Russian corporations to achieve a regionally focused redevelopment plan for the aging industrial base). One way or another, if Poroshenko wants to maintain the geographical integrity of Ukraine, he will have to cede a significant degree of political and economic autonomy on those, highly populated and industrially developed, parts of the country that remain significantly connected to Russia. This will, no doubt, imply a significant quantity of constitutional manuevering on Poroshenko's part. A unitary Ukrainian government is not going to survive negotiations with pro-Russian groups in the eastern oblasts, especially if Putin intercedes on behalf of a Ukrainian federation. In the end, Ukraine is not going to look the same, and this is not necessarily a bad thing, especially if everybody in the country can remain amicable and continue to embrace a mythic loyalty to something called Ukraine, whatever this national mythology actually implies in its connection to a decentralized politics and economics. At this point in this short post, it should be clear that I have as little respect for the concept of a Ukrainian nation as I do for the concept of an American nation - democracy is a localized phenomenon, and, to whatever extent we want to prioritize mythical linkages between populations constituting nation states, I believe that democratic articulations of the needs, interests, and hopes of a population should never be subverted to enforce transhistorical political unities when such bonds no longer correspond with political, economic, and cultural realities. Succinctly, if the Euromaidan revolution was a hopeful moment for many Ukrainians, then a concession of regional autonomy for the people of the eastern oblasts might, likewise, be a hopeful moment insofar as it enables these jurisdictions to pursue a course of development better suited to their interests.
Tuesday, May 20, 2014
Probing the Black Holes in My Geopolitical-economic Imagination: What to make of Narendra Modi's Win?
This post will be extraordinarily short and succinct, simply because India remains a black hole to me mentally. I have to confess that I know almost nothing about the internal politics or economic developmental status of the country except that it has experienced partisan domination in national politics by the Indian National Congress Party for almost the entire period since its independence and that economic growth has experienced a dramatic slow down in recent years, notwithstanding rapid growth in the 1990s and early 2000s. It is my understanding that Modi has promised to clean up corruption, reduce bureaucratic rigidities in relations between the central government in Deli and individual state governments especially with regard to industrial and infrastructural projects, reform tax codes to enhance economic growth, and reduce social welfare expenditures. In other words, it sounds like Modi is going to advance a protypical neoliberal reform in tandem with a Hindu nationalist cultural project, with possible negative connotations for Indian Muslims especially among the poor. In this manner, there may be plenty to criticize in regard to the direction Modi's policies will take, but these policies might additionally open up new spaces for radical alternative projects (i.e. decentralized cooperative/communist projects, filling holes left behind by the new direction of state economic planning policies and the retraction of meager social welfare policies) not otherwise envisioned in the BJP's plans for economic development. The most that can be said is that the world will have to wait and see.
China, Russia, Natural Gas, and the Global Alignment on Ukraine
The New York Times is reporting today that, notwithstanding an official visit by President Putin, China and Russia (through Gazprom) have so far failed to reach an agreement on pricing of natural gas exports from Russia (See Jane Perlez, "China and Russia fail to reach agreement on gas plan," New York Times, 20 May 2014, at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/world/asia/china-russia.html?_r=0). Apparently, negotiators from Gazprom have failed to sufficiently reduce their offer price of gas to the China National Petroleum Corporation to secure a long term supply contract with its erstwhile Chinese partners. The article rightly situates the negotiation of a supply agreement within the context of the Ukrainian crisis and the limited application of sanctions by the U.S. and EU against Russian individuals and corporate entities in response to alleged Russian interference with the internal politics of Ukraine.
Several lessons for American foreign policy, in relation to China, Russia, and Ukraine, make themselves apparent here. First, the potential threat for a long term reallignment of energy consumption by Europe, arising strategically in response to overly aggressive Russian regional policy maneuvers, seems to be taken seriously in Moscow (even to the extent that European, and especially German, policy makers have shown no willingness to contemplate long term changes in energy consumption) if Gazprom is actually moving closer to an agreement with China. If this is the case, we might conjecture that such a deal is inevitable. As Perlez notes in the Times article, quoting a Chinese international relations expert, any deal would amount to "a Chinese financial assistance contract with Russia in the guise of commercial payment." That is to say, Chinese policy makers are increasingly identifying a community of interests with Russia in preventing the West from flexing its muscle in Russia's Ukrainian backyard. What we have here is a joint effort by Russia and the PRC to constrain or otherwise undermine American foreign policy influence in Eurasia. Pointedly, it is succeeding even if a deal has not yet manifest itself. The reticence of the EU to undertake more aggressive action in support of Kiev is evocative of the diminished capacity of the U.S. to exercise a Russophobic policy regime with the help of our Western European friends.
A deal between Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation would be apt to manifest a range of effects on international markets, particularly markets for liquified natural gas. Critically, the present political crisis in Ukraine (and previous crises, resulting in stoppages of gas flow toward Europe), reveal the extent to which natural gas and, especially, capacities to produce and export liquified natural gas are becoming important geopolitical levers in the tripartite relationship of the U.S., Russia, and China. Thus, it might be possible, over the course of a decade or more, for the U.S. to develop its capacity to produce and export substantial quantities of liquified natural gas for the EU market and even to meet some quantity of East Asian demand. However, in addition to the potentially pernicious effects from diverting large quantities of inexpensive natural gas from the domestic U.S. market, any politically motivated effort to supplant Russian exports of natural gas where Russia currently has a foothold must, at least, be met with an aggressive effort by Russia to counter American efforts by securing new markets, especially in China. In sum, the idea of deal between Gazprom and China threatens the potential for a well-regulated long term strategic American energy policy to achieve strategic objectives relative to Moscow, especially if China is consciously committed to play Moscow off against Washington, at least in the short run, in its own self interests. Under the present circumstances of toxic partisanship in Washington (with petty, short-sighted partisan debates over old news like the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi), it is, moreover, improbable that the U.S. could devise and commit to a long term strategic energy policy.
Taking these issues into account, in addition to other relevant concerns like the effects of a Russo-Chinese deal on stagnating Russian and slowing Chinese economic growth, it would seem pertinent for the U.S. to reconsider the manner in which we are boxing ourselves into a corner on Ukraine, siding with liberal and no-so-liberal nationalists in Kiev against the possibilities of rapprochement between pro-European and pro-Russian entities through negotiation. If the possibilities for a gas deal between Russia and China reflect, at least in part, the effects of the crisis in Ukraine, then the ability of Russia to leverage Chinese support is liable to enable Putin to act more aggressively in his dealings in the eastern Ukrainian oblasts. Translation: if the U.S. maintains its current line of uncritical support for Kiev, then Kiev will lose Donetsk, Lugansk, and Kharkiiv and Washington will end up with an embarrassing quantity of egg in its face because our erstwhile Ukrainian allies pushed pro-Russian forces in the eastern oblasts too hard under conditions where Putin was positioned to gain the upper hand!
Several lessons for American foreign policy, in relation to China, Russia, and Ukraine, make themselves apparent here. First, the potential threat for a long term reallignment of energy consumption by Europe, arising strategically in response to overly aggressive Russian regional policy maneuvers, seems to be taken seriously in Moscow (even to the extent that European, and especially German, policy makers have shown no willingness to contemplate long term changes in energy consumption) if Gazprom is actually moving closer to an agreement with China. If this is the case, we might conjecture that such a deal is inevitable. As Perlez notes in the Times article, quoting a Chinese international relations expert, any deal would amount to "a Chinese financial assistance contract with Russia in the guise of commercial payment." That is to say, Chinese policy makers are increasingly identifying a community of interests with Russia in preventing the West from flexing its muscle in Russia's Ukrainian backyard. What we have here is a joint effort by Russia and the PRC to constrain or otherwise undermine American foreign policy influence in Eurasia. Pointedly, it is succeeding even if a deal has not yet manifest itself. The reticence of the EU to undertake more aggressive action in support of Kiev is evocative of the diminished capacity of the U.S. to exercise a Russophobic policy regime with the help of our Western European friends.
A deal between Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation would be apt to manifest a range of effects on international markets, particularly markets for liquified natural gas. Critically, the present political crisis in Ukraine (and previous crises, resulting in stoppages of gas flow toward Europe), reveal the extent to which natural gas and, especially, capacities to produce and export liquified natural gas are becoming important geopolitical levers in the tripartite relationship of the U.S., Russia, and China. Thus, it might be possible, over the course of a decade or more, for the U.S. to develop its capacity to produce and export substantial quantities of liquified natural gas for the EU market and even to meet some quantity of East Asian demand. However, in addition to the potentially pernicious effects from diverting large quantities of inexpensive natural gas from the domestic U.S. market, any politically motivated effort to supplant Russian exports of natural gas where Russia currently has a foothold must, at least, be met with an aggressive effort by Russia to counter American efforts by securing new markets, especially in China. In sum, the idea of deal between Gazprom and China threatens the potential for a well-regulated long term strategic American energy policy to achieve strategic objectives relative to Moscow, especially if China is consciously committed to play Moscow off against Washington, at least in the short run, in its own self interests. Under the present circumstances of toxic partisanship in Washington (with petty, short-sighted partisan debates over old news like the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi), it is, moreover, improbable that the U.S. could devise and commit to a long term strategic energy policy.
Taking these issues into account, in addition to other relevant concerns like the effects of a Russo-Chinese deal on stagnating Russian and slowing Chinese economic growth, it would seem pertinent for the U.S. to reconsider the manner in which we are boxing ourselves into a corner on Ukraine, siding with liberal and no-so-liberal nationalists in Kiev against the possibilities of rapprochement between pro-European and pro-Russian entities through negotiation. If the possibilities for a gas deal between Russia and China reflect, at least in part, the effects of the crisis in Ukraine, then the ability of Russia to leverage Chinese support is liable to enable Putin to act more aggressively in his dealings in the eastern Ukrainian oblasts. Translation: if the U.S. maintains its current line of uncritical support for Kiev, then Kiev will lose Donetsk, Lugansk, and Kharkiiv and Washington will end up with an embarrassing quantity of egg in its face because our erstwhile Ukrainian allies pushed pro-Russian forces in the eastern oblasts too hard under conditions where Putin was positioned to gain the upper hand!
Tuesday, May 13, 2014
On Town of Greece, NY v. Galloway et al.
As with many of the other U.S. Supreme Court decisions on which I have commented in this blog, this case raises divergent concerns, related, on the one hand, to the liberal, secular protections extended through the U.S. Constitution and, on the other hand, to localized democratic practices. The case itself (see "Town of Greece, NY v. Galloway et al.," no. 12-696, October Term, 2013, at: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-696_4f57.pdf) involves a challenge under the First Amendment "Establishment clause" (i.e. "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion") by two residents of the town of Greece, New York, who objected to the particular nature of prayers offered prior to town board meetings from 1999 to 2010. Until the respondent's directly approached the municipality in 2008 to complain about the practice, these prayers were explicitly and solely Christian in nature. The respondents argued, on the contrary, that invocations before town board meetings should be non-sectarian, "inclusive and ecumenical," reflecting the larger diversity of the community. In response to initial complaints, municipal officials made jestures in 2008 to include non-Christian invocations, including prayers offered by Jewish, Baha'i, and Wiccan followers. It then, apparently, resumed the practice of only inviting Christian clergy to give invocations.
In first hearing about this opinion and reading criticisms made in various contexts, I will concede that my first inclination was that the Court majority, represented through Justice Kennedy's opinion, issued a ruling wholly consistent with my understandings of First Amendment protections against the establishment of religion. To some extent, after giving a cursory reading of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and the dissents by Justices Breyer and Kagan, I continue to hold this view, but with certain reservations. Notably, Justice Kennedy appears to rest his defense of the practice of Christian invocations in Greece on the grounds that such invocations do not imply coercion. The respondents were at liberty not to participate in prayers that did not conform to their personal beliefs. As such, the majority opinion holds that the Establishment clause does not protect citizens from merely feeling offended or otherwise exluded by particular sectarian invocations. To the contrary, Justice Kagan's dissent makes a persuasive case that it is precisely within the participatory democratic framework of local/municipal government that officials owe some greater degree of responsibility to ensure that citizens can legitmately feel included as coequal members within a diverse community within which residents practice multiple faiths. In this respect, some greater effort should have been made by the town of Greece to actively solicit the offering of invocations by members of alternative, minority faith traditions, a responsibility in which, the evidence seems to show, municipal officials failed.
My own feelings on this case demonstrate my tendency to embody views on federalism and on the centrality of democratic practices over judicial discretion in defining Constitutional requirements that are simply not consonant with the perspectives of either side in this decision. That is to say, I question the entire logic of partial incorporation of Bill of Rights protections against state, county, and municipal government practices as a matter inconsistent with Constitutional practice, the textual requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment on states notwithstanding. Further, even to the extent that there may be some legitimacy in the incorporation of First Amendment protections against actions by states, counties, and municipalities, I privilege democratic practices by general purpose (state, county, and municipal) governments above the particular Constitutional restrictions on governmental practices at least insofar as such practices do not, on their face, expressly challenge particular Constitutional provisions. The Establishment clause, as an area in Constitutional jurisprudence, has proven too open to interpretation to define any explicit boundaries on what a state or local government can do short of explicitly coercing citizens to undertake specific religious practices as a condition of enjoying the privileges of citizenship.
With these principles in mind, I really cannot disagree with Justice Kennedy's majority opinion - the respondents were never explicitly forced to sit down and offer Christian prayers as a condition of being heard as citizens in a local governmental hearing. On the other hand, the arguments issued in Justice Kagan's dissent raise noteworthy questions about when meaningful participation within participatory democratic practices at a local level may be hindered by discriminatory jestures. Clearly, municipal officials in the town of Greece seem to have gone out of their way to make it clear that Christian citizens were the only citizens whose opinions really mattered to them in the exercise of local government. If the local democratic practices of a municipal government exude participatory openness in form but the substance of such practices exudes a sense of exclusion toward certain classes of citizens, then do we really have a robust and inclusive democracy? My own feeling, in this regard, is that, having failed to secure the ends that they had sought through the Federal judiciary, the respondents should take their case to their fellow citizens in Greece. They should state emphatically that the practices of the municipal government are innately discriminatory, notwithstanding the five-to-four majority opinion of a split Court, and they should build the necessary democratic coalition to see to it that the practice is ended once and for all. If they succeed in doing so, then democracy will enjoy its day of victory over sectarian prejudice.
In first hearing about this opinion and reading criticisms made in various contexts, I will concede that my first inclination was that the Court majority, represented through Justice Kennedy's opinion, issued a ruling wholly consistent with my understandings of First Amendment protections against the establishment of religion. To some extent, after giving a cursory reading of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and the dissents by Justices Breyer and Kagan, I continue to hold this view, but with certain reservations. Notably, Justice Kennedy appears to rest his defense of the practice of Christian invocations in Greece on the grounds that such invocations do not imply coercion. The respondents were at liberty not to participate in prayers that did not conform to their personal beliefs. As such, the majority opinion holds that the Establishment clause does not protect citizens from merely feeling offended or otherwise exluded by particular sectarian invocations. To the contrary, Justice Kagan's dissent makes a persuasive case that it is precisely within the participatory democratic framework of local/municipal government that officials owe some greater degree of responsibility to ensure that citizens can legitmately feel included as coequal members within a diverse community within which residents practice multiple faiths. In this respect, some greater effort should have been made by the town of Greece to actively solicit the offering of invocations by members of alternative, minority faith traditions, a responsibility in which, the evidence seems to show, municipal officials failed.
My own feelings on this case demonstrate my tendency to embody views on federalism and on the centrality of democratic practices over judicial discretion in defining Constitutional requirements that are simply not consonant with the perspectives of either side in this decision. That is to say, I question the entire logic of partial incorporation of Bill of Rights protections against state, county, and municipal government practices as a matter inconsistent with Constitutional practice, the textual requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment on states notwithstanding. Further, even to the extent that there may be some legitimacy in the incorporation of First Amendment protections against actions by states, counties, and municipalities, I privilege democratic practices by general purpose (state, county, and municipal) governments above the particular Constitutional restrictions on governmental practices at least insofar as such practices do not, on their face, expressly challenge particular Constitutional provisions. The Establishment clause, as an area in Constitutional jurisprudence, has proven too open to interpretation to define any explicit boundaries on what a state or local government can do short of explicitly coercing citizens to undertake specific religious practices as a condition of enjoying the privileges of citizenship.
With these principles in mind, I really cannot disagree with Justice Kennedy's majority opinion - the respondents were never explicitly forced to sit down and offer Christian prayers as a condition of being heard as citizens in a local governmental hearing. On the other hand, the arguments issued in Justice Kagan's dissent raise noteworthy questions about when meaningful participation within participatory democratic practices at a local level may be hindered by discriminatory jestures. Clearly, municipal officials in the town of Greece seem to have gone out of their way to make it clear that Christian citizens were the only citizens whose opinions really mattered to them in the exercise of local government. If the local democratic practices of a municipal government exude participatory openness in form but the substance of such practices exudes a sense of exclusion toward certain classes of citizens, then do we really have a robust and inclusive democracy? My own feeling, in this regard, is that, having failed to secure the ends that they had sought through the Federal judiciary, the respondents should take their case to their fellow citizens in Greece. They should state emphatically that the practices of the municipal government are innately discriminatory, notwithstanding the five-to-four majority opinion of a split Court, and they should build the necessary democratic coalition to see to it that the practice is ended once and for all. If they succeed in doing so, then democracy will enjoy its day of victory over sectarian prejudice.
Referendums in Donetsk, Lugansk
As an adamant defender of the democratic principle and the self-determination of sovereign polities, I have a few points to make regarding the plebiscites held in Donetsk and Lugansk on May 11. First, both oblasts deserve the chance to determine their fate democratically in the post-Euromaidan political environment of Ukraine. This statement should not be read as a validation of the actions of pro-Russian militias, seizing Ukrainian government facilities and fighting it out with security forces. Rather, at some point the interim government in Kiev and pro-Russian factions in Donetsk, Lugansk, and Kharkiiv will have to sit down and start talking to each other about what the post-Euromaidan Ukraine will look like and whether or not the three big eastern oblasts with large ethnically Russian populations are going to remain part of the country. Before this can happen, everyone really needs to put their weapons down. And maybe if everyone can come to a consensus that the larger crisis is not going to be resolved until everyone puts their weapons down and starts talking, then maybe a real, live, actual referendum process can be contemplated to determine what the good people, ethnically Ukrainian and ethnically Russian, of Donetsk, Lugansk, and Kharkiiv actually want - whether they want a strictly unitary regime centered on Kiev and tilting decisively westward, separation and independence from both Kiev and the Russian Federation, or separation from Ukraine and unification with Russia. If the press in Kiev can be believed (a very generous if), the majority (perhaps 70%) of the population in the eastern oblasts wants to remain with Ukraine and continue to have a unitary regime. I find this claim nonsensical, in view of the larger ethnic diversity in the region (i.e. much larger ethnically Russian populations than anywhere else in Ukraine, not counting Crimea which should never have been counted as part of Ukraine in the first place!) and the initimate economic linkages between these oblasts and the Russian Federation. On the other hand, it seems quite plausible to me that an overwhelming majority of the population wants neither to be trapped in a unitary relationship with Kiev contrary to its cultural and economic interests, nor to be swallowed up by Russia (notwithstanding the loud effect of pro-Russian militia activity).
The results of the May 11 referendums should be a foregone conclusion. Of course they will support secession from Ukraine and any follow up referendums on unification with the Russian Federation will likewise demonstrate overwhelming support. Only one side, and perhaps a tiny minority of the population, is actually being represented here, from areas of the two oblasts (Donetsk and Lugansk) where pro-Russian forces are already in control. Outside of these areas, it would stand to reason that anyone who actually wanted to vote one way or the other would have been excluded anyway because the regime in Kiev regards the entire process as illegal. With this in mind, the May 11 referendums are an unmitigated partisan farce. The populations in these oblasts deserve to have a referendum to determine their future, but this referendum was not it, and whatever support the Russian Federation and Putin confer on this outcome, it can only be regarded as a tactic by an isolated faction that can never legitimately claim to represent the sovereign will of the entire population in these oblasts. If Russia proceeds to annex these oblasts, it can only be viewed as an act of aggression against populations that never had a legitimate opportunity to make their voices heard.
Emphatically, the larger problem that still manifests itself here is that calmer heads are not being allowed to prevail over brute force. In the short run, the interim government in Kiev may prevail in imposing its will against pro-Russian groups in the eastern oblasts. Conversely, the pro-Russian minorities might achieve their aims if Russia intervenes militarily to annex the oblasts. In either scenario, the larger hopes of the majority in these oblasts is going to be given short shrift and, as a consequence, the prevailing regime will stand as an aggressor and an oppressor against the sovereign democratic rule of the polity. In the long run, this situation is untenable - it will promote an endless reiteration of political instability and economic stagnation for the Don Basin and for Ukraine as a whole. In this regard, it would behoave all parties involved to put down their guns and start talking to each other.
The results of the May 11 referendums should be a foregone conclusion. Of course they will support secession from Ukraine and any follow up referendums on unification with the Russian Federation will likewise demonstrate overwhelming support. Only one side, and perhaps a tiny minority of the population, is actually being represented here, from areas of the two oblasts (Donetsk and Lugansk) where pro-Russian forces are already in control. Outside of these areas, it would stand to reason that anyone who actually wanted to vote one way or the other would have been excluded anyway because the regime in Kiev regards the entire process as illegal. With this in mind, the May 11 referendums are an unmitigated partisan farce. The populations in these oblasts deserve to have a referendum to determine their future, but this referendum was not it, and whatever support the Russian Federation and Putin confer on this outcome, it can only be regarded as a tactic by an isolated faction that can never legitimately claim to represent the sovereign will of the entire population in these oblasts. If Russia proceeds to annex these oblasts, it can only be viewed as an act of aggression against populations that never had a legitimate opportunity to make their voices heard.
Emphatically, the larger problem that still manifests itself here is that calmer heads are not being allowed to prevail over brute force. In the short run, the interim government in Kiev may prevail in imposing its will against pro-Russian groups in the eastern oblasts. Conversely, the pro-Russian minorities might achieve their aims if Russia intervenes militarily to annex the oblasts. In either scenario, the larger hopes of the majority in these oblasts is going to be given short shrift and, as a consequence, the prevailing regime will stand as an aggressor and an oppressor against the sovereign democratic rule of the polity. In the long run, this situation is untenable - it will promote an endless reiteration of political instability and economic stagnation for the Don Basin and for Ukraine as a whole. In this regard, it would behoave all parties involved to put down their guns and start talking to each other.
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