The Triumphant Power of Multilateral Diplomacy: Hopes for Success of the Iran Nuclear Deal

As an initial reflection, I neither know nor understand all of the conditions and provisions of the agreement negotiated between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the six-party (U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany, Russian Federation, and People's Republic of China) contingent, seeking to dismantle certain developments within Iranian nuclear research for an eight-year period, restrain the possibility of military use of nuclear technology by reducing stockpiles of fissile materials for fifteen years, and incorporate a rigorous inspections regime through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in return for selective relief on economic sanctions, enabling Iran to market larger quantities of petroleum products globally and to access certain financial sector resources previous closed by U.N. Security Council resolutions.  On the other hand, the fact that such an agreement could be successfully negotiated through a patient, ongoing process of diplomacy between major world stakeholders in the interest of meeting Iran half way in developing a sensible set of restrictions on Iranian nuclear development in the interest of peace, stability, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons represents a very hopeful outcome and a possible model for the resolution of other issues in Southwest Asia, notably the Syrian Civil War and the current geographical/sectarian fracturing of Iraq.  To the extent that such issues might be introduced to a multilateral diplomatic methodology, it should also include a far more inclusive range of regional stakeholders (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, etc.), the exclusion of which might have been the very critical oversight that actually facilitated the realization of an agreement with Iran, per se!   
             I am confident that numerous barriers exist to the ratification and successful implementation of the agreement, both within Western governments and in Iran.  In Washington, in particular, the Republican Senate majority will almost certainly oppose the terms of the agreement unanimously.  The ultimate capacity of the Senate to impose legislative conditions on the Obama administration's ability to faithfully apply U.S. obligations, particularly with respect to relief of U.N. Security Council mandated economic sanctions on Iran, will, however, rely on the ability of Republican Senate leaders to enlist a threshold quantity of Democratic Senators to overturn a presidential veto on Senate initiatives.  The major groundwork in this direction will likely be made by the Washington Zionist/Israeli lobby, determined to enforce the Israeli Likud government's categorical opposition to any deals with Iran over nuclear development that do not simultaneously include a recognition of Israel's right to exist.  It seems almost certain that a handful of pro-Israeli Democrats, most notably Charles Schumer of New York, will side with Republicans in opposing any deal with Iran.  While there is no guarantee that Obama will not encounter a veto-proof majority in opposition to a nuclear deal with Iran, it seems unlikely that the Zionist lobby will be able to yank ten to twelve Democrats out of Obama's camp.  For a lame-duck president, Obama continues to command an adequate degree of loyalty among Democrats, solidified perhaps by the promise of a resurgence in Obama's presidential-year electoral coalition as a potential force behind Democratic candidates in 2016, to make it difficult for most Senate Democrats to turn their noses up at a major diplomatic achievement by a president whose foreign policy successes have been sparse.  Similar struggles, however not as substantially impacted by the influence of Israeli political pressures, are sure to obtain in the British, French, and German parliaments.  In particular, given recent setbacks in electoral support for the Hollande government, acquiescence by French legislators to an Iran nuclear deal would not seem to be a guaranteed outcome.  On the other hand, given their proximity to Iran and the potential for European firms to profit from reintegration of Iran into various global markets, it would seem that Europe's stakeholders have much to gain from the successful ratification and implementation of an Iran nuclear deal. 
            Acknowledging my relative ignorance on the internal politics of Iran, it is my understanding that Iran's parliament will undertake debate on the agreement and that President Rouhani's moderate/centrist coalition currently enjoys a favorable balance in relation to hard-line Islamic revolutionary radicals.  On the other hand, the ultimate approval of the agreement will rest in the hands of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni and the net outcomes of parliamentary debate may fall on deaf ears.  While it seems possible that Khameni would reject the inspections regime as a subversion of Iran's sovereign right to unfettered nuclear development, it seems more likely that rigidities on Iran's end will emerge over the term of the agreement, as IAEA officials begin to inspect nuclear facilities and construct a timeline of Iranian nuclear development to determine where nuclear engineers and scientists currently stand with regard to the enrichment of weapons grade uraniam and/or plutonium.  In the near term, Khameni and the country as a whole stand to gain from ratification of the agreement and implementation of basic provisions to facilitate sanctions relief in accordance with preliminary timelines. 
            Concluding, I am not sure how good of an agreement might be under consideration here.  In certain respects, I agree with the general purposes of nuclear non-proliferation and can understand how and why the development of weapons grade fissile material by Iran would introduce destabilizing dynamics to the region.  Certainly, the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear arsenal would, on its face, represent an existential threat to Israel while simultaneously undermining Israel's current nuclear monopoly in the region.  Of at least equal importance, it would introduce a nuclear dynamic into the Arab-Persian/Sunni-Shi'a political rivalry, almost certainly inducing Saudi Arabia to undertake its own nuclear weapons program.  On the other hand, provisions within the current agreement apparently facilitating Iranian importation of a range of new conventional weapons systems after eight years of verified compliance with the nuclear inspections regime may induce a conventional arms race between Iran and the Sunni Gulf states.  Either way, it is worth asking whether the U.S. and other Western partners to the nuclear agreement will be made manifestly worse by the progressive reintegration of Iran into global trade in petroleum markets and, secondarily, in international weapons trade (again, after an introductory period of compliance).  For that matter, if we had walked away from the bargaining table, would an eventually nuclear-armed Iran truly represent a significant threat to the U.S., Great Britain, France, or Germany?  I think the answer to both questions is no. 
            Truthfully, I do not think that regional peace has been well served by the maintenance of an Israeli nuclear monopoly in Southwest Asia - if such a monopoly has aided in preventing the recurrence of conventional ground wars between Israel and its closest neighbors, then it has done little to achieve a lasting peace between Israel and its Palestinian cohabitants to the militarily occupied, colonized spaces of the West Bank and Gaza.  Moreover, it is questionable to what extent Iranian nuclear development has been driven by the presence of an Israeli nuclear monopoly as it has been induced by the existential threat of regime change against the Islamic Republic posed by U.S. Central Command!  In the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of 2003, the development of a tangible nuclear deterrent by Iran, capable of being employed against invading U.S. forces or against U.S. assets elsewhere in the world (to say nothing of developing a modest intercontinental nuclear capacity!), constitutes a completely rational response.  In certain ways, any relaxation of weapons embargoes against Iran, however strictly regulated, might aid the Islamic Republic in meeting its objectives to maintain a substantial military deterrent against unilateral U.S. military operations.  Beyond this, as a first step toward more cordial relations, an agreement between Iran and the U.S., however lodged in a multilateral context, might represent an open door toward other pragmatic diplomatic endeavors to realize other regional objectives.  With this thought in mind, it is certain that the U.S. and Iran remain far apart in coming to terms with the present situation in Iraq (i.e. not only the current struggle against the Islamic State but also the long term political status of Sunni populations in Ninawah and Anbar provinces if the government in Baghdad is to remain decisively controlled by the country's Shi'a majority) and the fate of the Assad regime in Syria.  On the other hand, if the present multilateral framework has facilitated a nuclear agreement, then maybe further negotiations in the same framework might at least begin to address these other problems.
            Fundamentally, this Iranian nuclear agreement represents a defeat, however transitory, for the sort of political unilateralism favored in Washington by various leaders of the Republican Party (and at least some Democrats) and in Israel by the Likud government, suggesting that the only meaningful way to come to a resolution of the problem of Iranian nuclear development would be at the end of a gun.  To the extent that actual diplomacy between negotiators at a bargaining table, under the principle of mutual respect for legitimate self-interests by all parties with a stake in the political isolation and/or reintegration of Iran into the global economy and the community of well-behaved sovereign nations, realized an agreement that seems likely to be implemented is good news for peace and the pursuit of more peaceful resolutions to intractable problems in Southwest Asia.      

Europe at all costs? Against the new Greek Bailout

Following from previous statements on this blog regarding the efforts by the European Commission and other actors to prevent a Greek exit from the Eurozone, the negotiated bailout extended to save the Greek banking system from insolvency is a bad deal for all parties involved, especially for Greece.  The fundamental problem here remains the same: the inclusion of Greece and other weak, peripheral national economies in a unified currency zone with Germany and other relatively strong national economies generates conditions in which the stronger economies enjoy excess, uncompensated export benefits from implicit currency devaluation at the expense of rendering weaker economies at a permanent disadvantage from implicitly overvalued nominal exchange rates.  The only thing that a new injection of borrowed funds from the ECB, IMF, and other Eurozone creditors, in exchange for a new round of austerity measures, will generate is the need for more injections in the future as a struggling Greek economy struggles more with no perceptible means of permanent relief.  The Greek economy will never actually begin to turn around until the country dispenses with the Euro, reintroducing a new national currency or undertaking the creation of a new interregional currency consolidating national economies more complementary to Greece.  If, in certain respects, the package of austerity measures that the Eurogroup is now imposing on Greece may be ultimately necessary and, perhaps, salutary to long term development of the Greek economy (something that is highly doubtful in regard to the imposed selloff of capital assets), then the resolution still leaves Greece with the biggest of all possible disadvantages, the inability to devalue its currency in order to realign the strength of Greek currency in relation to the country's export performance and the international marketability of its debt.  Only an exit from the Eurozone can achieve this end! 
          The capitulation of Greek Prime Minister Tsipras to an austerity package at least as bad as the one the Greek electorate cast its consensus against is nothing short of stunning!  Is it really possible that the international financial sector has this much power to threaten a national government with the incontrovertible demolition of its banking sector if it does not concede to measures guaranteed to inflict abject pain on the most vulnerable individuals in the country (i.e. pensioners who will be subject to significant cuts in benefits as one condition for the extension of new loans to Greece)?  Tsipras should voluntarily step down from power for having surrendered Greek political and economic sovereignty to financial blackmail!  More importantly, his government, from the point that it was initially elected, should have committed far more time, energy, and creativity to planning for the eventuality that Greece would be leaving the Eurozone and returning to an independent national currency.  Its apparent failure to do so is manifestly inexcusable.     
         Again, an overarching problem in the engagement of Greece with the European Union as a whole is that the partial and unsatisfactory institutions of monetary union without a complementary union of centralized fiscal redistributive mechanisms and a banking union have revealed just how superficial the impetus for political unity in the place of national chauvinism actually is in Europe.  To place the issue in an historical context more familiar in view of my American background, instead of creating a United States of Europe, the European Union has settled for something closer to an Articles of Confederation, in which the Germans remain free to abdicate their responsibilities for the failure of Greece to adequately adjust to a permanent appreciation in purchasing power and permanent inflation in the cost of Greek exports in the face of relatively competitive international commodity markets for Greek export sectors.  A more robust union, including international fiscal redistributions from the strong to the weak national economies, has not been and will not become politically feasible - not at a time in which the Euroskeptics have grown so strong across multiple EU member states.  Rather, it might be time for Europe to take a step back, scrap the single unified currency and, maybe (if policy makers continue to exercise some degree of creativity), restructure the Eurozone to incorporate multiple tiers with different consolidated currencies reflecting complementary macroeconomic performance among currency partners.  More fundamentally, the political motivations that prompted currency consolidation in the first place (alignment of all member states to peaceful, interdependent economic development in place of destructive economic competition promoting militaristic nationalism) need to survive the breakup of the currency, which, for the sake of Europe's future, should now be inevitable!  This, however, is a matter of ideological commitment between the various nations of Europe, militating against any resurgence of Twentieth century zero-sum political calculations. 

Who won the American Civil War?

In the wake of a couple of months during which I seemed to lack the initiative to write about anything, I am hopeful that I am regaining the capacity to be needlessly long-winded in addressing numerous topics, most of which remain hopelessly abstract in their conception and connection to my everyday life, preparing marinated meat kabobs for July 4th celebrations in the lower Pioneer Valley of Massachusetts.  This particular post seeks merely to advance a contemporary question in regard to the supposed objectivity of American history at one its most calamitous moments.  I intend to write at length on this topic when I have truly taken the time to approach it from all angles in order to produce a genuine piece of amateur historical analysis that could bore to sleep anyone unwilling to take for granted that the topic cannot be objectively answered at the present time.  I am asking it, moreover, with the larger supposition/suggestion that we New Englanders, in particular, as American citizens, should really engage ourselves in debate over just what our history actually means.  In doing so, it would be to our benefit if we took the liberty to throw out all of our preconceived notions of what has actually happened from the first moments of our revolution to the present day in order to truly open ourselves up to the possibility that everything we learned in history class was, sadly, erroneous. 

As Southern Republican politicians now stumble to get out of each others' ways in denouncing the legacy enshrouded in Confederate battle flags and reassuring the rest of the country that the South has decisively transformed itself since the days of Jim Crow segregation and the high tide of mainstream Ku Klux Klan White supremacy, the massacre at the Emanuel African Methodist-Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina (as well as other suspicious events since then involving Black churches) makes it at least somewhat apparent to me that it would be a mistake to regard the South as a monolithic entity and, as such, to make conclusive statements with regard to how the South has changed, both since the 1960s and, for that matter, since the 1860s.  Going further, to the extent that we recognize the demographic complexities implicated in any analysis of the South, we need to further recognize that, more than with any other region of the U.S., the history of the South and of Southerners, both White and Black, has been profoundly shaped by the Civil War and by the particular interpretations that Southern students of the conflict have brought to the table in an attempt to situate it in reference to the myriad processes leading to its initiation. 
With this in mind and the peculiar (but, possibly, mistaken) notion that "the victors write the history books," it appears to me that the question of who actually won the American Civil War remains subject to debate.  In a larger sense, notwithstanding the fact that the guns have lain silent since 1865, it might be conceivable to ask whether the Civil War actually ended, or whether it has simply continued in other forms, along diffuse, non-geographically-defined fronts with divergent, punctuated moments in which the same issues come back to the fore, engaging renewed and continuously evolving arrays of combattants over states' rights, the expansiveness of federal governmental power, race relations, and the broader meaning of the American experience as a collective historical legacy.  These are questions for which I, emphatically, lack a definitive objective response.  Rather, I hope soon to articulate a persuasive argument at length in order to say, most succinctly, that the particular ways in which we, as a nation (whatever that might imply!), have entered into debate on the meaning of this moment in our history have shaped the political, cultural, and economic development of the U.S. since the end of the Civil War and will continue to do so.