Catholicism, Christology, and Marxism II: Epistemology and Faith

This post seeks to address the problem of knowing, both as a matter of (non-material) religion and (material) science.  Specifically, what does it mean to know that there is God?  Alternatively, what does it mean to know that there is gravity or electromagnetism?  What does it mean to know the mechanism by which a change in the US Federal Reserve federal funds rate target impacts thirty year fixed mortgage rates in metropolitan Boston or the impact of judicial precedents on a tax law matter before the US Supreme Court?  What does it mean to know that recyclable pickup in your neighborhood is on the first and third Tuesday of the month?  What does it mean to know that you are suffering from a migraine headache caused by one too many tall cups of coffee today or that you are feeling anxious and depressed, in part, because your baseball team has just been knocked out of the playoffs and, in part, because the person you dated three nights ago hasn't gotten around to calling you back yet?  Do these forms of knowledge belong to the same species or are they qualitatively different?  
             The problem of knowing in all of the above cases belongs to a branch of philosophical inquiry called epistemology.  The account that follows here will not pretend to be, in any sense, exhaustive as a summary of epistemological thought, but it will seek to lay out a coherent framework elaborating my approach to epistemology and, with specific reference to the broader purposes in this document, my consideration of religious faith as a form of knowledge.  Emphatically, adhering to a broadly Marxian perspective, grounded in epistemological differentiations between realism and performativity, I will seek to argue that it is impossible to either validate or dismiss transcendental religious claims and that it is, similarly, impossible to either validate or dismiss claims to the insoluble ontological complexity (overdetermination) of the material universe, the radical incommensurability of subjective knowledge, and the latent/proximate performativity of theoretic knowledge.
            To begin, we need to differentiate two distinct phases of knowledge: phenomena and theory.  In this respect, I employ the term "phases" in order to differentiate levels of integration for elements of knowledge.  Phenomena describe the basic units of sensory observation in the material universe, constituting pieces of descriptive reality absent any deeper embedding/situating of such facts within an analytic framework.  It is, in some degree, difficult to describe precisely what I mean by such phenomena precisely because the concept of phenomena described here abstracts from the internalized bodies of knowledge through which individuals accumulate sensory experience of the material universe.  That is to say, the notion of phenomena implies that something exists beyond our accumulated experience and internalized mental integration of reality, something that is radically pure, unaffected in its impact on our senses by knowledge that we already possess, and lacking the nearest analogy from sense objects that we have already experienced.  It would constitute an unaccountable blast of incomprehensible visual imagery, sound, smell, touch, taste,  and/or emotional effect.  I do not mean to demand such a strong level of purity in positing the phenomenon as an object of knowledge.  Rather, phenomena routinely combine with preexisting accumulations of experience and introspective linkages between phenomena.  The point here is not to posit phenomena as pure forms of knowledge, but as the sensory bases through which the referential, experiential frames embodied by individuals are regularly updated.
            Proceeding in these terms, a pure phenomenalist conception of reality, constituted as an undiminished product of sensory experience with the material universe, represents an impossibly abstract vision of the production of knowledge.  The capacity to know reality always involves an integration of multifarious, disconnected sensory experiences that must, in accordance with certain analytic rules, be combined into some coherent, intelligible order.  Phenomena have to be integrated into schema with other phenomena under rules constructed introspectively.  Otherwise, every piece of phenomenal observation represents a singular, disconnected fragment, defying even the possibility of description - to describe something within the world invariably demands some mental point of reference in order to analogize.  That is to say, the mind constructs reality out of collected phenomenal elements, under rules that enable the elements to be combined in a logical and coherent way.  

       However, as such, reality always remains subjective, because every integration of thought with sensory matter, including formal learning, is unique to each individual.  This is important because it means that, even individuals with a virtually identical experience of a particular phenomenon will not situate the phenomenon against other elements constituting their realities in the same way if their prior bases of experience are different.  Such differences in experience form a fundamental basis for the notion that individual referential frames in describing and explaining reality are radically incommensurable.  On some level, no matter how much we share a common vocabulary describing material existence, something is always lost in translation between individuals.

       Theorization is the process through which phenomena get assembled into coherent frameworks in order to construct reality.  I mean this in the strictest sense, that each individual constructs their own reality from their own experiences and from the theoretic foundations that enable experiences to be combined into coherent explanations regarding the accumulation of experience.  Theorization transforms pure phenomena into mentally situated objects of theory.  The transition from pure phenomena to the construction of theoretic objects ultimately involves a series of mental processes beyond the observation of phenomena, at both the subjective/individual and intersubjective/social levels.  The most rudimentary of these is analogy - the capacity to know a fragmentary phenomenon is, at least partly, predicated on the capacity to compare it to a previously experienced phenomenon.  In this regard, beyond pure sensory observation, a phenomenon must be cataloged against the set of all previously observed phenomena to determine where the new observation can be mentally situated.  Such a process of cataloging necessarily spills over into deeper reflections concerning the relations between phenomena.   The conclusion that a particular, newly observed phenomenon shares an analogous place to a previously observed phenomenon recognized as an apple invariably involves both a process of referencing prior experiences of apples and a simultaneous situating of the phenomenon apple against other phenomena experienced as a banana, an automobile, a dishwasher, or myriad other objects of experience not analogous to apples.  There is the construction of differentiations between (inanimate) objects, sentient beings, states of being, actions/processes, intentionalities, and emotional states, each corresponding to different sets of phenomena, cataloged and situated from a continuous series of sensual experience from birth/self-realization to the moment of contemporaneous observation.  Each phenomenon resides within the realm of materialities, capable of being cataloged, situated, and fully known as elements of material reality, simultaneously accompanied with particular emotional reactions aroused through memory.

      To the extent that we regard conceptual pathways in theorization as valid frameworks in coming to terms with the production of reality, we have to recognize that, at the subjective/individual level, we simultaneously need to account for distinct pathways of neuro-physiological and neuro-psychological processes that facilitate, shape, and/or inhibit the conceptualization of phenomena into objects of theory.  Such processes include electro-chemical transfers of stimuli between neural receptors and central/cerebral processing nodes, but they also include a range of ancillary physiological processes, such as the secretion of enzymes or hormones, alterations in cardiovascular flow rates, and muscular/skeletal reactions, all of which play a role in framing a particular phenomenological experience even if that role is wholly unconscious.  In certain respects, the bifurcation of the process of theorization into subsets of mental/cognitive and physical/anatomical components is arbitrary.  Any separation of the body from the mind/cognition (or, for that matter, the soul) is a product of particular theorizations of human existence (e.g. neuro-psychological prioritization of anatomical electro-chemical signalling v. Cartesian mind-body dualism).  If the mind and the capacity of individuals to conceptualize reality is itself contained/defined by the electro-chemical transfer of stimuli within or across the body, then any specification of the conceptual pathways of theorization would amount to a single theoretic interpretation of the flow of neural stimulations and the production/storage of memory within the body.  There is, however, no way to conclusively validate such an anatomically centered interpretation of knowing.

       It is possible to conceive of theorization, at this level, as a wholly individual and subjective processes grounded in personal experience, cataloging, situating, and, especially, physiological and psychological reactions, however, this is not an adequate conclusion if we are to fully acknowledge the social character of human behavior.  Any conceptualization that seeks to advance a foundation of knowledge has to recognize the myriad ways in which human interactions shape the manner in which individuals understand the world.  The production of theoretic knowledge driven by sensory experience of material reality is intertwined with processes of interpersonal/intersubjective communication, the bases of which are framed theoretically by socio-linguistics/semiotics and group psychology.  The basic capacity of an individual to convey the experience of a phenomenon with others who have not similarly experienced it themselves is predicated on the existence of a shared and (imperfectly) mutually recognized symbolic system, including not only verbal or written speech, but also non-verbal expressions or emotional signals.  The presence of such systems and of latent imperfections in the transmission and translation of concepts (signifiers) attached to phenomena (signifieds), especially where multiple, radically different semiotic or linguistic systems have to be negotiated in communications, in turn, shapes the manner in which individuals theorize.  How do you convey an important and highly consequential phenomenological insight like "the bridge is out" to someone who does not speak English or someone who does not communicate through audible/verbal speech (e.g. a deaf person communicating exclusive through a methodology of sign language)?  The importance of using a shared vocabulary to describe highly consequential elements of reality within particular, proximate populations of our highly social species cannot be overstated.   
         Likewise, the capacity of individuals to transmit experienced phenomena or, more fundamentally, theoretic interpretations (as analogies or more complexly situated understandings) of such phenomena to other individuals does not necessitate that such transmissions, however imperfectly translated, will be uncontested/non-contradictory.  In particular, any transmission of information between individuals may involve differences in the experience of implicated phenomena, past or present, such that the introduction of new information does not solicit an intended reaction on the part of the recipient.  How do you discuss phenomena like climate change, evolution, or the effect of prolonged exposure of asphalt roof shingles to vegetation (e.g. moss) if the individuals with whom you are conversing exhibit a fundamental (theoretic) disagreement with you on the validity and/or  consequential relevance of the phenomena?  At stake, in this regard, is the performative nature of phenomenological insights and theoretic assemblages of these insights in order to achieve some social consensus on a response.  If knowledge of melting ice caps in Greenland is to produce some desired response on the part of particular constituencies, then there must be some consensus on a theoretic pathway leading from the burning of fossil fuels to melting ice to rising sea levels and more volatility in weather conditions, and the establishment of such a consensus is difficult, especially when the compulsion on individuals to embark on a range of difficult responses is unevenly distributed across a social formation.  

       Finally, in regard to the social conditionalities of knowledge, we have to consider circumstances in which the basic acceptance of particular theoretic conceptions of reality becomes an initiation to community.  Such circumstances might be reflected in diverse religious traditions, but they must also be reflected in fidelity to a given scientific paradigm in the sense defined by Thomas Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962).  In either case, belonging to a particular community demands acceptance of a given set of ideas that may or may not contradict the experience or intuitive reasoning of particular individuals within the group or at its margins.  Such conceptions may, thus, take on the role of mantras conveyed by the true believers against potential apostates, and they may contain the seeds of fault lines against which paradigmatic conceptions of truth come into question.

        Our conception of knowledge, as a social construction, thus, demonstrates problems on at least two dimensions.  On the one hand, we are confronted with a basic inability of individuals to translate phenomena or theoretic insights into communicable knowledge.  On the other hand, given an imperfect capacity to translate knowledge, we are confronted with the potential for dissonance between perspectives on reality and on the consequential nature of phenomena or derived theoretic insights, resulting in disagreement.  In practice, these dimensions are difficult to disentangle.  If it was possible to interject a universal standpoint of observation and a universally accepted semiotic code to inscribe all phenomena and theoretic insights, then we could isolate differences in knowledge related strictly to divergent individual interests.  Inevitably, differential interpretations of reality are never simply reducible to differences in individual self-interest.  On the other hand, differences in perceived self-interest frame our basic symbolic codifications of the world.  Finally, any notion that acceptance of a particular conception of reality is, itself, consequential to the manifestation of community must complicate any relationship between self-interest and communicable integrity of truth.  

         To this point, we have ventured to consider a basic differentiation between phenomena and theory as the foundational elements of knowledge about reality.  We have, further, dismissed sensory experience of phenomena, by itself, as a basis for knowledge, without a comprehensive effort to situate phenomena theoretically against other phenomena.  The alternative demands something that this account has, heretofore, rejected: the possibility of a universal standpoint on reality transcending positionality/perspective or, more minimally, the possibility that some kernel of intersubjective knowledge exists prior to individual perspective (sensory experience and introspective deduction).  For example, mathematics can be advanced as a repository of intersubjective knowledge existing prior to the experience of phenomena or even introspection on the nature of relationships between phenomena.  Two plus two is always four, irrespective of personal or cultural differences of perspective between individuals.  Shouldn't the existence of mathematics as a corpus of intersubjective truth validate the capacity of disparate individuals to evaluate phenomena and appropriate knowledge, by means of intersubjective universals, that will be invariant relative to individual perspective?

       My issue with the conclusion that mathematics must exist as an intersubjective repository of knowledge prior to sensory observation resides in the necessity of learning mathematical concepts.  Any concept that must be learned and can, thus, be deployed unevenly in correspondence with differential mastery of the concept cannot be advanced as a field of common intersubjective endowment.  In a very basic sense, the example of mathematics enables us to differentiate the capacity to conceptualize universal, intersubjective knowledge and the uneven appropriation of such concepts by individuals as a matter of (social) learning, introspective deduction, and/or sensory experience.  The abstract principle that two plus two equals four is distinct from the appropriated knowledge that two plus two equals four as an outcome of learning and subsequent application of theoretic analogies to real phenomena.  Furthermore, the utilization of shared mathematical principles to generate, say, systems of linear or cubic measurement or temporal scales need not enforce uniform and objective rules.  Basic mathematical rules may underlie both English statute and metric systems of linear measurement, but the establishment of fundamental units within both systems is ultimately arbitrary and grounded in a consensus among users regarding intra- and inter-systemic rules for calculation and translation across systems.    

        Provided we accept that pure accumulation of sensory observations of phenomena are insufficient for the realization of truth, it is possible to construct knowledge either by assembling large quantities of experiential observations and making inferences based on accumulated phenomena, or by forming preconceived hypotheses about material reality as a means for filtering and sorting how phenomena can be subsequently accumulated and employed to produce theoretically informed knowledge.  The former approach privileges the observation of phenomena in the production of knowledge, while the latter approach privileges the introspective establishment of definitive rules governing how we observe phenomena.  We will label the former approach empiricism and the latter approach rationalism.  

       Critically, practitioners of empiricism and rationalism share a basic set of presumptions about the knowledge of material reality.  They agree that material reality is unitary, but further, and critically, elements of material reality are separable in a way that enables individual elements to be analyzed.  They accept that such elements are essentially knowable, in the sense that is basically possible to accumulate enough knowledge about individual objects of analysis to understand how the objects of such knowledge work.  As such, an understanding of material reality appears additive - the accumulation of knowledge involves an endless process of adding onto what is already known to be true about reality, perhaps with the occasional subtraction of ideas that prove to be untrue by virtue of experience and/or logical incongruity with new ideas.  Finally, they accept that all knowledge produced either through the methodologies of empirical or rational construction must be objective, in the sense that they must be invariant relative to individual perspectives.  Two plus two must objectively equal four, regardless of individual contexts.  The observation of an object falling at a defined rate of speed in relation to distance and mass must be continuously objective regardless of who observes the object's movement.  Thus, what is true must simultaneously be objective and invariant relative to individual perspectives.  If this is the case, then the production of knowledge can only involve an accumulation of ideas that are objectively true.  We will label this perspective realism.  

          As defined, the perspective of realism is basically incongruous with Marxian presumptions concerning the production of knowledge.  First, approaching from the prioritization of sensory observation, realism rejects the principle that individual perspectives are fundamental in the observation of phenomena and, hence, in the production of induced knowledge from sensory observation.  It follows from realism's assertion of material objectivity in sensory observation that the communication/translation of observed phenomena between and across individuals may be characterized as a non-issue.  To the extent that the realist position can identify a problem with interpersonal communication of observed phenomena it must lodge its concern strictly with linguistic practice as a dead-reckoning in relating mutually exclusive experiences of finite elements in the unitary real.  That is to say, an inability of language/linguistic translatability of phenomena implies that the objective conceptual codification of reality in language is lagging behind the universal objective experience of the real.  For realism, it must always be possible to expand language to embody every unique element of the real, as it is possible to add and subtract from the unspoken/untranslated conceptual framework of known reality.  The additive character of language is a corollary to the basically additive character of material knowledge per se.  For Marxism, the linguistically incommunicable character of knowledge is a corollary to the basic uniqueness of individual experience with an incomprehensibly complex objective real. 
           Further, the privileging of singular competing approaches to the production of knowledge ignores a basic circularity in the interaction of thought and sensual observation to the theoretic process, particularly as it is conceived over longer time frames.  That is to say, to the extent that we regard methods of empiricism (e.g. the scientific method) and methods of rationalist introspection as emanating from divergent and mutually exclusive processes of inquiry, we obscure the ways in which sensual observation is shaped by introspective reduction and how introspection is shaped by prior sensual observation.  Invariably, theory, as the production of knowledge transcending pure observation of phenomena, must involve a continuous circular interaction of sensory experience and introspection.  The introspective conceptual architecture of mathematically thinking, for example, must, in some way, be grounded and continuously shaped by sensory observation.  The abstract conception that two plus two equals four must, thus, arise and continuously correspond to the experience of two plus two equaling four in sensory observation of the world (e.g. handling units of money).  On the other hand, the capacity to frame sensory observations of real objects in quantitative terms is, itself, a product of the construction of introspective rules enabling us to see real objects in measurable quantities.  In this sense, it is impossible to say and ultimately futile to even ask which comes first - the capacity to add things up in sensory observation of the real or the introspective creation of rules for adding things up in the abstract.
            If, in this regard, Marxism's approach to epistemology rejects realism, then what is it that we most critically reject in realist epistemology?  Answering this question lays the groundwork for the arguments on epistemology and, further, its relationship to the philosophical theoretics of being/becoming (ontology) that I mean to advance here from a Marxist perspective.  As such, my proposed Marxian epistemology shares with realism its assertion that material reality is unitary - a singular and objective whole/totality.  On the contrary, Marxism, as I understand it, rejects the ultimate knowability of this reality.  Neither is knowledge of reality additive in any practical sense - if we cannot know the unitary real as a whole/totality, then we simultaneously cannot assemble knowledge of arbitrarily experienced elements of the real in order to piece together an objective knowledge of the whole/totality.  The reasoning for these assertions against basic knowability and the additive nature of knowledge specifically relates to the theoretic contours of the Althusserian Marxist conception of ontological overdetermination.
            Ontological overdetermination, as I understand it, argues that material reality is seamless and universally connected in all of its elements.  It is, further, considered in strictly active (rather than static/passive) terms - material reality is constituted as the sum of all universally interconnected processes (rather than agents, as substances/forms that are made to act).  That is to say, material reality is considered in a perpetual dynamic of change/transformation/becoming rather than stasis, and change is propelled by the interconnection between all the individually changing elements constituting reality.  The transformation of each process is shaped by its relationship to all other processes, and, in turn, as it changes, each process shapes the transformation of every other process by which its own transformation is constituted.  Adding to the complexity implied here, the interconnection of processes cuts across any conceivable conceptions of scale, locality, temporal finitude, or (spatio-temporal) trajectory (e.g. progress/regress, evolution/devolution).  Such considerations and limitations on the workings of material processes and on the interconnections between processes are, as such, outcomes of the theorization process (i.e. our attempts to disentangle realities that cannot, truthfully, be separated in order to achieve some basic understanding of reality).
        Theory, as process, is, itself, wholly embedded within the broader complex material reality that it attempts to comprehend.  Simply stated, everything in the material universe, at every (theoretically) conceivable scale, changes and every change transforms everything else, across all (theoretically) conceivable scales.  As all other processes change, the theoretic process is itself re-constituted as a locus for its overdetermination by every other process.  And, as the theoretic process is transformed, the manner in which we see and, thenceforth, act upon the universe of non-theoretic process must be reshaped.  As it is impossible to step outside of the universe of mutually constituted and mutually constitutive processes to derive an objective understanding of the universe, our understandings of the universe must be a constantly changing outcome of our individual/subjective positionalities within the universe.  Simply stated, every individual is condemned to comprehend the reality of the universe from their own individual standpoint, shaped by the workings of every other process in the universe, from the Big Bang to the instant of time in which we stare out onto a discrete, finite corner in universal, interconnected, indivisible space. 
            Attempting, finally, to configure a more formal distinction within my understanding of the relationship between ontology and epistemology in an Althusserian Marxist theoretic, material reality can be conceived on two levels.  The real, that is to say, material reality/the universe, is single/unitary, seamlessly interconnected, continuously in transformation through the dynamic/overdetermined transformation of each of its constitutive processual component parts, and continuously objective.  As a singular totality of interconnected and mutually constitutive parts, the universe can only be comprehended as a totality.  To objectively know anything about the universe demands that we understand the universe as a whole and the manner in which any given, individual component part of the universe is connected to every other part of the universe.  Any attempt to disaggregate the universe in order to understand even a single component process can never yield an objective knowledge of the process without comprehending the complex positionality of the object process within the totality (i.e. how it is shaped by everything else).  Objective knowledge of any single constitutive element of the universe to the exclusion of all others is a misnomer.  Moreover, any attempt to conceive of an objective standpoint of comprehensive to such an object process demands that the seer approach from outside of the totality, from a position free from the capacity of the totality to transform the seer's unique capacity to observe the universe.
            Effectively, to objectively know the real, the universe as a totality and/or any of its constitutive parts, means to stand outside of the universe, to grasp it as a totality, and to comprehend the interconnection of all of the totality's parts across any and every conception of space and time.  Any conception of the real must, thus, be comprehensive.  If any constitutive component of the real can only be objectively understood as a locus for overdetermination by every other part, then any attempt to conceive of any individual component of the real must account for every conceivable constitutive relationship in a seamlessly interconnected totality.  As such, I assert that, for Marxism, objectivity is an impossible goal.  In this manner, realism, as a epistemological grounding asserting the capacity for objective knowledge through one or another analytic method, chases an impossible dream.  The real, as a level in ontological being/becoming, cannot be meaningfully approached.
           If we cannot approach the real, then we are strictly bound to the alternative level of theory/the theoretic.  That is to say, in order to come to terms with our positionality within the real, we assemble observations of processual phenomena, interpret these observations based on our past experiences of phenomena and our introspectively derived rules for observing and interpreting sensory observations, and then we weave together stories that explain/situate what we are experiencing and delineating its relevance for our existence within the universe.  Such a practice is always partial/non-conclusive and subjective, framed and shaped by the continuously changing positionality of the seer/theorist within the real.  Every individual can only ever see the universe through their own eyes and interpret it in reference to their own experiences, a reality that cannot be remedied by the communication/translation of insights between individuals because something is always lost in translation.
          Theory embodies a range of heuristic methodologies.  It's obvious that we can point to the scientific method (i.e. hypothesis-testing-thesis) as a means of formulating theory, but, in its broadest terms, theory consists of every conceivable set of methodologies transforming phenomena into knowledge by situating observed phenomena into an ordered relationship with other previously experienced phenomena in such a way that the mind can construct a unique, subjective conception of reality.  Every human being theorizes, if only to get out of bed in the morning on the correct side or to account, on this note, for why the day has gone so badly.  Any effort to assemble a set of experienced phenomena into a coherent explanation of reality is theoretic.  Methodology simply provides mechanisms for expanding the range of phenomena taken into account and sharpens the precision with which the theorist can identify patterns of analogy, causal chains between events, and temporal and spatial relationships.
          Theory is practical, in the sense that we continuously act on the universe and on its constitutive parts from what we know, and what we know emanates from the theoretic process.  We don't put the garbage out for pickup on Friday if we know that pickup is on Tuesday morning.  If we know that the fastest way to travel from Boston to New York City by car is to drive south down I-95, then we know not to take I-93 north in the direction of Manchester, New Hampshire because we are going to be driving in the wrong direction.  If we know that taking two ibuprofen tablets should relieve our headache but that by taking twenty tablets we would inflict severe damage on our digestive tract, then we limit our use of the drug.  You don't need to know how fast the earth rotates on its axis to understand how to leave your home and get to work on time in the morning.  If you are an aerospace engineer, then you don't need to conceptualize a relationship between the level of a particular microbial flora in your duodenum and your instantaneous capacity to utilize underlying principles of Newtonian physics in order to resolve an aircraft design issue.  A basic understanding of cause and effect in the workings of a particular process within the universe does not need to be objective/comprehensive in order to serve a practical purpose in the manner in which individuals, singularly or in (imperfect) combination/coordination with other individuals, approach the process.  It is not the objectivity/comprehensiveness of theoretically-derived knowledge that makes it significant but its capacity to reliably shape a set of actions, to generate expected regularities, or to propel transformations of reality.
           Finally, in the sense that all theory is individual and individually directed toward practical purposes that must act upon a universe shaped, in part, by and through divergent, theoretically-informed individual actions, theory is partisan.  The theoretic process and the translation/communication of theoretic knowledge and consequent (imperfect) coordination of theoretically-informed practice among individuals invariably engages in a reality within which divergent and contested interpretations of the real will contradict.  As the theoretic process is, itself, embedded within the overdetermined structure of the real, the continuous experience of conflicting theoretically-informed practices must shape both the ongoing theoretic process and the ongoing practices informed by theory as individuals seek to act in reference to both their unique knowledge and, implicitly or explicitly, their perceived self-interest.
          We are a social species.  No individual ever acts in a social vacuum, and, to the extent that every individual acts on the basis of what they know, the effectiveness of their actions and, hence, the effectiveness of the knowledge that informs their actions are shaped by the ways in which their actions conflict with those of others, informed by alternative bases of knowledge.  Generalizing these basic insights in particular contexts might give us a basis for articulation of something approaching game theory - matrices delineating sets of strategies by conflicting individuals with the effects manifest from each combination of conflicting strategies.  I don't intend to go in this direction, however, because it conveys, in my view, too much of an image of objectivity in the analysis of conflicting practices.  On the other hand, game matrices do lay out a conceivably useful methodology for framing the impact of competing strategies in interactions between individuals proceeding from divergent bases of knowledge.  Further, to the extent that we consider evolutionary game theoretic modeling, such analyses pattern a continuous learning dynamic in particular interactive practices, reiterating the importance to individuals of accumulating new information and adapting to changing circumstances. 
          In these terms, our argument on the partisan character of theoretic knowledge does not necessarily imply an implicit or explicit confrontational dynamic between individuals.  It does, on the contrary, seek to account for differences in the capacity of individuals to leverage power against others in acting from their particular referential frames of knowledge.  That is to say, there are differences in the ability of individuals to act in reference to their particular knowledge of the real.  To know does not imply a uniform capacity across all individuals to effectively act against reality.  Every individual manifests a diverse range of resources, including theoretic knowledge, enabling them to act on the real and conferring some degree of effectiveness in the manner in which they act.  At stake here is the manner in which aggregates of individuals are organized, in conjunction with the (imperfect) communication/translation of knowledge, and the manner in which non-human agents (animate or inanimate) can be organized to act on the behalf of a particular theoretic conception of the real.  In this respect, I mean to hint, at least subtly, a connection/contrasting between a Marxist overdeterminist ontological theoretic and something approximating actor-network theory (i.e. between seamless networks of processes and piece-wise networks of agents/human and non-human things that are made to act).   Simply stated, power, however it is articulated or defined, is important to the effectiveness of theoretic knowledge, and certain theoretic conceptions of the real are more powerful than others if they are marshaled with a sufficient mass of other resources to command effectiveness.
            To the extent that the persuasiveness of theory in communication/translation constitutes a marker for its power, in itself, the transmission of theoretic knowledge is fundamentally rhetorical.  I do not, in this regard, mean that theory seeks to deceive or to distort reality in the self-interest of its expositor.  Rather, the purpose of theory is always to shape the way reality is seen and acted upon.  Knowledge is a weapon in the articulation and the performance of reality, but the performative effectiveness of that weapon is contextual and bears on the manner in which diverse agents can be assembled to complement and reinforce the capacity of knowledge to reshape the real.  The knowledge that a microbial virus has been identified that has the potential to inflict a global pandemic of respiratory infections on human hosts is, for example, liable to be more powerful in effecting a change in the way its audience acts when wielded through mass media by immunological specialists associated with relevant public health organizations, advancing a particular threshold weight of phenomenal evidence (i.e. a pattern of human respiratory infections associated with the identified presence of a common microbial viral agent) and theoretically-informed analyses of transmission pathways for communicability of infection, than such a call would be if it was made by an unwashed homeless person, begging for spare change outside of a supermarket, in the context of other odd prognostications concerning the impending end of the world.  On the other hand, both of the above manifestations of knowledge share the common feature that they constitute arguments intended to shape the way in which their audiences view reality in order to transform the way in which those realities are lived.
              In sum, the inaccessibility of objective knowledge on material reality, grounded in the seamless universality and universal interconnectedness of process across time and space, is not problematic to Marxian epistemology to the extent that it engenders a dependency on theory/theoretic knowledge to comprehend the world.  Rather, it mandates that we understand knowledge, all knowledge beyond pure and unsituated phenomena, to be theoretical and, thus, partial/non-comprehensive, grounded in the subjective/individual experience of reality (including intersubjective learning), heuristic, practical (i.e. shaping the way a particular reality is understood in order to shape the way it is lived), partisan (complementing or contradicting other theoretically-informed knowledges), and rhetorical in its communication/transmission, shaped in turn by the contexts in which knowledge is communicated.  I will label an epistemological standpoint with these characteristics performative, in contrast to the previously identified standpoint of realism.
          To be clear, the differences here between epistemologies allude to particular comprehensions of the role of theory in relation to the real, not necessarily a difference in methods of investigation or research.  The scientific method can inform theories approaching from either a realist/empiricist epistemological standpoint or a performative standpoint, but, in the wake of theoretic methodology, each epistemological frame will read the signification of theory differently.  To the extent that realism assumes the accessibility of objective (and additive) knowledge of material reality, its criterion of signification resides in the proximity of theoretical insights to the objective truth of the reality it means to understand.  Even to the extent that realist epistemology affords room for skepticism of the realization of objective truth (i.e. criteria of falsification and the failure to falsify of a hypothesis as a provisional attribution of validity), it remains grounded in the dichotomy of true/false as the ultimate standard for evaluating knowledge.  Moreover, and importantly, the theoretic process (with/by its methodology) and its theoretic object become mutually disconnected from the totality of material reality to the outside of the interaction of theory and theoretic object.  In and of itself, realism presumes an ontological framework in which material reality is infinitely divisible/separable and in which the theorist can stand outside the object of theory as an impartial observer. 
          From a performative standpoint, theory is fundamentally an approach to a material problem requiring the production of knowledge, not a quest for objective truth.  It isn't enough to merely posit skepticism of the possibility for objectivity.  For that matter, even if we grant to realism the sort of pragmatic reading suggested, for example, in William James' conceptualizations of validity criteria (i.e. is a theory useful because it is reliably predictive of reality?), performative epistemology goes beyond a practical or pragmatic reading of the relationship between theory and reality.  A theory may be important for its capacity to regularly structure expectations in particular everyday practices, but we can grant a theory importance beyond its capacity to predict future outcomes.  Signification in a performative epistemological approach is grounded on a theory's consequential capacity to shape the manner in which the reality that a theory addresses is lived.  What is the impact of the theory on its object?  Does it mirror the purposes that instigated its promulgation or diverge from them?  How does the impact of the theory lead to further consequences, intended or unintended, and how do we view these consequences in relation to other material processes?  It isn't important that a theory reflects some abstract conception of the truth or is falsified but that it manifests real effects (some possibly intended, some possibly unintended) when it is employed in diverse contexts and combined with diverse other forms of human and non-human agents to reshape reality in ways that may be both positive and negative.  In short, theory and the theoretic process is embedded in material reality and it participates in the continuous transformation of material reality.  Performative epistemology means to approach and, in part, unravel the social/integrative role of theory.
            To more definitively elucidate the divergent analytic terms in approaching either from a realist or a performative epistemological standpoint, let us take the example of theorizations in human genetics.  From a realist standpoint,  assessing between the Mendelian theory of genotypic inheritance under an assorted set of rules (i.e. dominance and uniformity among alleles/phenotypic traits, random segregation of alleles in gamates/sexual reproductive cells, independent assortment of geneotypic traits) and, say, the Lamarckian/Darwinian theory of pangenesis (i.e. continuous transfer of acquired phenotypic traits through gamates into offspring), we might advance the judgment that Mendelian theory is superior to the extent that scientific experimentation has demonstrated its greater effectiveness in predicting genetic outcomes over multiple generations of offspring for observed species.  In these terms, Mendelian theory must be closer to the objective truth of genetic inheritance and Lamarckian/Darwinian theory, demonstrably falsifiable under many conditions, farther from the truth.  Furthermore, Mendelian theory has established itself as an effective building block around which exceptions from Mendelian inheritance rules can be recognized and functionally added to our broader repertoire of knowledge on genetic inheritance, thus bringing us incrementally closer to absolute, objective knowledge of genetics.
             In performativity, we might agree that, pragmatically speaking, Mendelian theory is more useful than Lamarckian/Darwinian theory at predicting future distributions of genotypes and phenotypes within given populations of a species.  On the other hand, we would want to go beyond the basic useful explanatory power of the former theory to further query its consequences in communication/translation as a body of knowledge susceptible of incorporation into other constructions of reality.  Where does the (imperfect) transmission of Mendelian theory lead?  In a certain sense, Mendelian theory leads to the broader development of contemporary genetic theory, including molecular analysis of DNA and the mapping of the human genome.  As such, it has, in part, nurtured an important corpus of scientific research enabling us to address a range of concerns in medicine and, more broadly, fleshing out mechanisms for elaboration of the Darwinian theory of natural selection by means of genetics.  It would be purely counterfactual to argue that Lamarckian genetics might similarly generate such research, but, historically, the transmission of Mendelian theory clearly conveyed a range of questions to be advanced in diverse communities engaged in molecular research, and the range of answers provided over time have generated opportunities to steer molecular genetics on to different agendas, including genetic modification of agricultural products, cloning, and eugenic modification of human populations.  Whether we consider such agendas to be latent within the particular transmission of knowledge expressed through Mendelian insights on genetic inheritance or, simply, unintended consequences of innocuous expositions of a timeless, objective truth, we can certainly construct a genealogy of ideas in these concepts that would contain Mendelian theory.
               Furthermore, we would want to ask how the eventual success and transmission of Mendelian theory, as a foundation of population genetics and a precursor to molecular genetics, over Lamarckian/Darwinian pangenesis enabled certain questions to be asked but foreclosed other important avenues of research.  If, at its root, pangenesis is predicated on a definitive relationship between cellular mutation (i.e. arising from/through acquired traits) and sexual transmission of acquired traits across generations, then, realizing the practical limitations evident in Darwin's initial construction of the theory, research agendas emanating from such a theoretic basis might have led to a range of insights on genetic mutation, seeking to discover a molecular-level actuator in the transformation of populations through mutation - something close to contemporary ideas in microevolution.  If Mendelian theory steered research, specifically, toward specification of molecular mechanisms in sexual reproduction for population genetics (DNA and the human genome), then such a Lamarckian/Darwinian legacy might have moved evolutionary microbiological research earlier in the direction of microbial-conditioned mutations in genetic coding (e.g. of the sort now evident with CRISPR).  Not wanting to overindulge in counterfactuals, the point here is that every successful theoretic insight opens certain paths in the development of knowledge and closes or, at least, impedes others.  The truth or falsification of a theory might be less important than where the theory leads over time, as individuals offer critiques, specifications, modifications, and exceptions to the prevailing insights afforded by existing knowledge.
             More importantly, if theory constitutes a single component in the constitution of reality, available to be combined with other agents, human and non-human, in order to shape and transform reality, then we would always need to examine the broader effects of particular theories on non-theoretic processes.  How has the legacy of Mendelian genetics shaped, directly or indirectly, diverse elements in the social existence of human beings (e.g. the GMO foods we eat or, alternatively, build movements to protest/boycott; the life-saving but immensely expensive legacy of genetic pharmaceutical research, spilling over into the broader economics of healthcare in the United States; the toxic politics of racial superiority and eugenic manipulation of gene pools; the linking of genetic/genealogical trees, transcending diverse national boundaries and racial groupings, to paint diverse individual portraits of common humanity)?  What rhetorical arguments remain to be formulated on the corpus of Mendelian genetics in medical science, bioethics, economics, agricultural sciences, ecology, partisan politics, etc.?  The social signification of a theory is an open question that can never be closed, even on the grounds of its supposed falsification.     
              In summary, for realism, theory is a quest for objective truth where elements of reality can be isolated and subjected to impartial mechanisms of sensory examination or clarified by deliberate introspection to premeditate on the reality to be examined by the senses to reveal the essential.  The methodology employed in theorization is important to such a degree that prioritization of sensory evidence or coherence of introspective logic constitute legitimate grounds of epistemic contestation.  Validation is grounded in objectivity, where objectivity implies invariance between diverse subjective perspectives.  Whatever is true must be true regardless of its observer.  If we grant, within a realist standpoint, that theory cannot precisely achieve comprehensiveness in elucidating the truth of its object, then we can minimally argue that theory may be predictive of reality in the sense that it reliably shapes expectations on its theoretic object.
               Performativity registers this final, minimalist position on realism.  Yes, theory is practical in the sense that it seeks to represent the reality that it addresses in order to shape the way it is approached.  In this sense, theory defies any specification of methodology - every human being theorizes in an effort to come to terms with the incommensurable complexity of material reality.  Theory is the way we make sense of the senseless blare of phenomena before our senses, to situate the incomprehensible against our experiences in a way that enables us to negotiate the real.  The performative standpoint on theory goes beyond this insight, however.  Theory is an argument on reality among diverse and contradictory arguments, where neither the capacity of theory to fully comprehend the complexity of reality nor the intersubjective transmission of each argument are ever perfect.  Theories manifest divergent capacities to persuade, dependent on the contexts in which they are transmitted, and the transmission of a theory does not necessarily imply that its expositor/theorist will achieve the desired effect from transmission.  The transmissions of theories are attended by both intentional and unintentional effects.  As such, theories constitute forms of agency, to be combined with other forms, both human and non-human, to be made to act.  In so doing, theories, by their agency, intervene in the realities within which they are transmitted.  If for realism, theory constitutes a value-neutral statement that can be validated through the true/false dualism, the performative position renders the theoretic process fully embedded within the totality of material processes and its outcome, theory, exists as a (non-human) social agent, capable of being made to act in ways that participate in the constitution of reality.
                At root, realism and performativity reflect their differing ontological assumptions.  If, for realism, the material reality of the universe is constituted as a sum of mutually independent parts, each with its own independent essential nature/being and/or logic of development/becoming, that can be separated and analyzed independently, then it is possible to isolate elements of reality and develop objective, verifiable knowledge on each independent part and to aggregate individual parts to construct an additive portrait of an objectively true universe.  For performativity, at least as I have characterized it in relation to Althusserian Marxist overdeterminist ontological theory, material reality has to be understood as a totality of mutually interconnected and mutually constitutive processual parts in constant transformation.  In this sense, theory, as a material process, cannot be extracted from the universe in which it is contained and from the myriad other processes that constitute it.  It is impossible to derive objective knowledge of material reality because it is impossible to step outside of the universe to derive an independent and unbiased standpoint on its infinitely complex dynamics, as it is impossible to extract any particular part of the universe and objectively posit its connection to everything else.  The task of theory can never be so daunting.  Theory exists to help us to cope with the complexity by storytelling, putting bits and pieces of reality together, in the hopes that our stories will be useful and, perhaps, will transform the world in desirable ways.  For performativity, theory is all that we have to produce the knowledge that enables us to make sense of senseless reality.
                  Proceeding, thus, from this reflection that epistemology is grounded in basic understandings on the nature/construction of material reality, we can derive a more common root to all of the forms of knowledge introduced at the opening of this post.  In the end, all knowledge is an act of faith, because only faith can bridge the gap between the existence of reality and our capacity to understand it.  In this manner, a basic conception that the universe is constituted by mutually independent parts that can be separated and individually analyzed cannot be, in itself, validated by research.  It is an act of dogmatic faith transcending the capacities of any method to certify such a perspective as true, as it is an act of faith to posit either the human sensory organs or the introspective capacity of the human mind/brain as an impartial observer of reality.  The same can be said for an image of the universe as universally and seamlessly interconnected and through the complex unity of an infinite number of constitutive processes.  It is my faith that such a conception of the universe is valid that enables me to move forward to argue that all knowledge is theory and that all theory is simply storytelling put to practical effect.
               Beyond this point, faith comprehends the capacity to encompass theoretic knowledge of both an incomprehensibly complex material reality and our imaginations/revelations of a transcendent/non-material/immaterial reality.  To know that there is God is, therefore, simply and definitively, as much an act of faith as knowing the value of the Newtonian gravitational constant or knowing the time of day that the letter carrier will deliver your mail.  These are not objective forms of knowledge and they can never be validated beyond the particular criteria of signification embodied in the epistemological foundations from which they are advanced.  That is to say, we might empirically test the validity of the Newtonian constant and, as such, fail to reject it as a valid dead reckoning of the force of gravity in relation to the mass and distance of two objects, but, within the terms of the scientific method, such an experiment can only hold as a provisionally valid representation of the force of gravity, as evident within the specific conditionalities/context of the experiment.  Epistemologically, any effort to bridge the distance between a failure to falsify and the attribution of (timeless, spaceless, objective) truth is an act of faith, conditioned by experiential repetition, logical consistency, or multifarious pragmatic motivations (e.g. group-think).
               Alternatively, if the Newtonian constant simply emerges from one story among many to explain the phenomenon of gravitational attraction, then we might ask how such a theoretic insight has shaped the ways in which human beings have approached problems involving gravity, including building construction, aeronautics, and astrophysical research, and, further, we might ask why it has been a more compelling argument than other conceivable solutions to the problem of gravity.  We might further ask how the particular terms of Newtonian theory both revealed particular elements of material reality and obscured others, demanding alternative, revolutionary theoretic conceptions that overthrew certain Newtonian insights and reinforced others (e.g. Einsteinian physics, quantum mechanics).  In the end, all of these efforts in theorization merely reflect a struggle to come to practically terms with certain aspects of an incomprehensibly complex reality.
                In these terms, theoretic knowledge of the transcendent/non-material reality defies validation outside of faith, but the significance of such knowledge always raises concerns in regard to material reality.  How does knowledge that there is God shape the lived human experience of material reality?  Where does the knowledge of God intervene in questions of ecology, biology, physics, economics, political processes/governance, etc.?  Before the European Enlightenment, the knowledge of God intervened as a story explaining the legitimacy of autocratic governance in early European national states, for example.  Such theories/stories continue to shape the experience of governance in other global contexts (e.g. the Papacy, the Iranian Shi'a Islamic theocracy).  For some groups in the secular West, the knowledge of God shapes the experience of science in particular ways that, in turn, demarcate lines of controversy between communities of intellectuals (e.g. the Young Earth community with its peculiar takes on time, biology, geology, and scriptural evidence of truth).  The point for Marxism and for Marxist epistemology, as I understand it, is not to falsify the knowledge of God.  It is to query the significance of these stories to material existence in their particular contexts and, further, to question the possibilities of connection between knowledge of transcendental reality and the material development of communism, as the definitive object of Marxian theory.  How has the knowledge of God shaped the experience of class processes (i.e. the production, appropriation, distribution, and receiving of surplus labor)?  In turn, has it tended to reinforce or undermine exploitation, the socialization of labor processes, or the realization of collective appropriations of surplus?  These problems will further structure the approach of posts to follow here. 
                            

Old (Keynesian) Wine in New (MMT) Bottles I

Modern monetary theory (MMT) is a recent addition to the landscape of macroeconomic perspectives on the relationship between the money supply, price inflation, sovereign debt, and real economic activity.  In effect, it advances the simple proposition that the money supply, in fiduciary (non-metallic) monetary systems, is a government construct, emanating from the act of fiscal expenditure.  That is to say, government spending summons real economic activity into existence, compensated with money created for the same purpose.  This money then largely circulates, summoning still more economic activity into existence until it is withdrawn from circulation, entering into private hoard or returning to the government in the form of taxes or lending.  As such, receipts of fiscal revenues or borrowing by the government, generally, appear not as constraints on government spending but as regulatory mechanisms to control the pace of economic activity generated by the circulation of monetary resources - higher taxes and increased government borrowing slow down the pace of private economic activity by withdrawing money from the private sphere.  

         The ultimate novelty in this approach to the money supply is that it turns the problem of fiscal solvency for states utilizing sovereign currencies on its head.  For MMT, it makes no sense to ask whether a government can fiscally afford to spend money on public services without raising taxes or borrowing provided the macroeconomy stands below full employment of production factors (a critical point).  Effectively, the production of real goods and services summoned by the government's actions will pay for the creation of new additions to the money supply - the government can print new money to spend it, and, up to a point, it will not have to worry about generating price inflation.  The basic point, in this respect, concerns the relationship between the money supply and aggregate constraints on real economic productivity (i.e. the total mass of production factors available and offered, the prevailing levels of production technologies, and the efficiency of distributive mechanisms for produced goods and services).  If resources exist to produce new goods and services with an expansion of government spending, and those resources can further be deployed efficiently to produce the streams of new goods and services that would need to be generated to meet induced demand as the recipients of government funds recirculate their incomes, then new government spending will have, at most, a modest inflationary impact on the prices of goods and services.  

           Having been, to a substantial degree, outside of academic environments where I might have been exposed to MMT earlier, I first started hearing about MMT in relation to the Green New Deal introduced by New York Democratic Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Massachusetts Democratic Senator Ed Markey.  Ocasio-Cortez has apparently utilized MMT to argue that the federal government can embark on vast levels of new fiscal expenditures, backed by massive expansions of debt, without worrying about induced price inflation ( see Noah Smith, "The Green New Deal would spend the US into oblivion," on Bloomberg Opinion, 8 Feb. 2019, at: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-08/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-s-green-new-deal-is-unaffordable).  My initial reaction was that this entire line of reasoning seemed unavoidably plagued with hogwash.  After listening to one of MMT's initial academic/political popularizers, Stephanie Kelton of Stony Brook University, on an economics podcast, explaining MMT in somewhat greater detail (see "What is Modern Monetary Theory? (with Stephanie Kelton)," on Pitchfork Economics with Nick Hanauer, 23 April 2019, at: http://www.pitchforkeconomics.com/episode/what-is-modern-monetary-theory-with-stephanie-kelton/), I realized a few things, however.  First, left-leaning partisan players like Ocasio-Cortez are, importantly, overplaying the conclusions of MMT without grasping its larger nuance and missing important conditionalities of the theory, sadly, to the detriment of its larger (rhetorical) appeal.  As a result, instead of appreciating the particular ways in which MMT could inform the budgetary process as a consequential counterargument against more Monetarist and otherwise austerity-oriented perspectives, at least on the political left, the theory is encountering vigorous resistance.  In this regard, it does need to be emphasized that MMT is not, in itself, a radically transformative new approach to macroeconomic analysis.  It is just a slightly novel combination of old Keynesian arguments about the relationship between the money supply and real economic growth to emphasize a few relevant rhetorical insights on the fiscal process.  Finally, the question of whether MMT reveals any new truths about macroeconomics ultimately can be answered in revisiting the same themes that have played themselves out in theoretic struggles between old Keynesians, New Keynesians, Post-Keynesians, Monetarists, and New Classicals on the role of monetary expansions in reshaping expectations regarding real economic growth.  That is to say, I mean to argue that, on the level of theory, there just isn't anything new in MMT.  It isn't making any arguments about human behavior that have not already been made many times over again in the recent or more distant past in economic theory.  The newness of MMT resides exclusively in its particular packaging, and the nuance of this packaging can be readily subverted by partisans who attempt to utilize the theory to justify arguments it was never conceived to prove.
           The rest of this document attempts to flesh out these general observations regarding MMT.  Emphatically, the arguments made by MMT with regard to government spending in relation to the growth of the money supply need to be situated more thoroughly with regard to the nature of money.  That is to say, we desperately need to embark on a speculative anthropology of money as a social relationship to ask where the state fits in and, in so doing, query the relationship between market processes (as the raison d'etre of money) and the state.  Beyond this, we need to situate MMT more fully in relation to traditional (General Theory) Keynesian, New Keynesian, Post-Keynesian, Monetarist, and New Classical thought essentially as divergent attempts to produce dynamic readings of the Quantity Theory of Money through diverging conceptions of expectations.  Finally, I do need to evaluate the rhetorical value of MMT as a contribution to the budgetary debates in the US federal government and elsewhere if only to ask how MMT might be meaningful even if its arguments are granted a requisite degree of nuance and modesty.

A Speculative Anthropology of Money

In its most general sense, money constitutes a medium of social relations.  We can configure the roles of money in social relations in two particular senses as passive and active modes of relation.  In the former, passive sense, money constitutes a standard for the attribution of prices on particular goods and services or on portfolios of abstract claims to property in goods and services in relation to diverse, finitely divisible quantities of money.  In the latter, active sense, money is a medium of exchange and measure of values, representing equivalence between definite masses of goods or services being actively transacted between individual parties to a transaction.  These are the two roles on which Marx concentrated his attention in his introduction to the economic concept of exchange value, relative to the utilization of monetary valuations, in volume one of Capital.  They are, as such, my logical starting point, but I need to dig deeper, if only because Marx's treatment is incurably tainted with metalism.  Fiduciary money can't be reduced to a value under a labor time embodiment theoretic.  Even as labor time embodiment theories are  more complicated and more social than they appear at first glance, the valuation of fiduciary money is more complicated as it is considered against conventional value theories.  The critical point that I need to settle on here regards the quintessential social, consensual attribution of value to money.
           I label this section a "speculative" anthropology of money because I know next to nothing about the actual (pre)history of monetary forms beyond recitation of Keynes' brief insights at the beginning of his Treatise on Money about the beginnings of coinage and ancient Chartalism (i.e. the institution of state monies) and Adam Smith's chapter in the first book of the Wealth of Nations on the origins of money.  This paucity of knowledge on the history of money matters very little for the larger rhetorical mission on which I have embarked.  I can (rationally) speculate to develop rhetorically convincing arguments about the development of monetary economy and, more importantly, its contemporary use.  How do we conceive the development of money as a medium of social (market) relationships?  What relationship does money have to the state (as sovereign political power) and how does democracy/democratic sovereignty transform this relationship?  How does trade between sovereign monetary systems refract the roles of money?  All of these questions need to be, at least minimally, addressed here.       

          Monetary economy distinguishes itself principally from economies utilizing pure barter.  The creation of a money commodity (or a representative monetary form), characterized (ideally) by temporal durability, spatial portability, finite divisibility, and ready acceptance across real transactions over time and space, constitutes something relatively new in the history of human commerce.  It is a critically important transition.  The absence of a universal equivalent that can be carried from one transaction to myriad others prevents individuals in possession of a certain portfolio of goods or the capacity to deliver a set of services to render this set of commodities onto others who need them without compromising their own sets of needs that prompted the exchange process.  That is to say, a person with a set of shirts looking for a pair of shoes doesn't have to go looking around for someone with a pair of shoes looking for shirts.  He can sell the shirts for money and use the money to buy shoes.  Moreover, he need not buy the shoes today - he can wait to buy the shoes next week or next month, or he can take the money from the site of his initial transaction to some other place where he can obtain a better price for shoes.  The existence of money transforms the conditions under which market transactions happen, eliminating the spatial and temporal limitations of pure barter.
         What does it take to get us from a pure barter economy to an economy with a universal equivalent possessing the desirable physical properties we seek in money?  The key obviously resides in the property of universal acceptance.  You can't walk into a bar, order a beer, and present the bartender with a handful of seashells in payment unless seashells are an accepted universal equivalent in market transactions, however portable, durable, or divisible seashells might be.  For that matter, the capacity of a particular good or service to be accepted as a universal equivalent across transactions may transcend the physical characteristics of the money commodity.  An economy that accepts live cattle as legal tender to pay debts and obligations may encounter serious limitations on the scale and complexity of its broader organization, but the social determination that live cattle constitute a universal equivalent, standard of price, and measure of value in all other commodities is conclusive.  In important ways, the larger organization of a non-barter economy is shaped by its participants' choice of a universal equivalent and the proximity of that choice to ideal conditions (portability, durability, divisibility).  

         The distinction between commodity money (e.g. metallic specie money) and non-commodity fiat money is, to some degree, a critical issue.  In particular, restrictions on the growth of the money supply exhibit greater rigidity in commodity money-based systems, and the function of money as a universal measure of value is relatively more rigorous, at least within certain theoretic approaches (e.g. a Marxian labor time embodied theoretic).  For conservative minds who value the stability of market prices above all else, metallic money approaches an ideal that fiat money can never match and that managed, representative money (e.g. paper money backed by a metal with legally sanctioned conversion standards) only imperfectly imitates.  The gold standard, as a compromise managed money alternative to metallic commodity money, has, thus, captivated a great many monetary conservatives since its ultimate downfall in the 1970s.  The problem is that metallic currencies can be debased, sometimes almost imperceptibly, and managed representative currencies can have their conversion rates readjusted to such a degree that actual conversion into metallic money becomes a fantasy underlying the operation of, for all intents and purposes, a fiduciary fiat money system.  If metallic and managed monies reflect a plea for objectivity in the face of the vagaries of international currency exchange, incorporating the effects of both commodity and capital flows, then they are simultaneously a false promise, anchored on the willingness of influential parties to hold currencies at arbitrarily fixed values or arbitrarily constrained relationships to specie.  The fundamental virtue of the gold standard exists in its capacity to enshroud the power of financial authorities in the illusory objectivity of the value of a physical commodity.  In the end, all currency reflects an implicit universal acceptance of a set of value relationships/relative prices or, more modestly, of a mechanism in which the value contained in separate commodities can be brought to equivalence prior to exchange by means of a universal equivalent, and this acceptance encompasses the use of either commodity money or fiduciary fiat money.  It demands that the users of a currency exhibit trust that the issuer will not undertake reckless measures that undermine the capacity of the currency to constitute a measure of value.  Hence the fiduciary relationship between the state/central bank and every participant within a monetary zone.
          Before leaving the subject of metallic currency, my theoretic background imposes on me an obligation to attempt to resuscitate Marx for his own sentiments about the valuation of money.  Marx indisputably connected the labor time embodied in the extraction and refining of metals with the role of metals as a standard of price.  That is to say, if it takes x hours of necessary abstract labor time to produce a pound of silver and 10x hours to produce ten pounds, then one pound and ten pound currency notes, backed by silver, hold their value and divisibility across various denominations based on variations of labor time embodied in the actual production of the metal.  I harbor misgivings about this view at least as great as those I harbor toward the underlying premises for support of the gold standard.  This is a quintessentially Modernist attempt to frame the value of money in objective terms, connected to a broader objective approach to the valuation of commodities.  It suffices to say that Marx's views on monetary economy and on value theory, per se, cannot be extracted from the time and the mindset of their originator without simultaneously confronting Marx's epistemological presumptions and challenging them in reference to our own.  Reading Marx as a Postmodern Marxist, I simply cannot accept the idea of reading the Marxian labor theory of value as an objective value theory any more than I can accept Marx's metalist reading on the valuation of money as objective.  No theory commands objectivity - all theories, however rudimentary and simplistic or intricate and complex, are subjective, heuristic, and rhetorical.
          Approaching Marx's ideas in these terms, the basic Marxian labor time embodied theoretic constitutes a (subjective and rhetorical) framework for analyzing the creation of value from the production of commodities, in the same way that marginal utility-based commodity valuations constitute a competing (subjective and rhetorical) analytical approach.  Indisputably, on some level, all produced goods and services are products of a labor process, and, accounting for recursive chains of past labor processes culminating in the final preparation of an object of consumption, the quantity of labor time imparted in the production of any good or service must, in some way, on average, be related to its value in market exchange.  Conversely, the extension of this framework to money still leaves us with problems if we are to accept the idea that universal acceptance constitutes the fundamental property of money as a universal equivalent in market exchange, even if we are dealing with strict metallic specie.  On some level, money has to be different from every other commodity with a value corresponding to labor time embodied, and this difference is most readily apparent with state fiduciary fiat money.  Fiat money, in paper or any other form, holds a fictitious value, in the sense that its place as a universal equivalent to commodities in exchange can never correspond to the labor time embodied in the currency.  On the other hand, this is a collective fiction, even to the extent that attributions of monetary value are implicitly shaped by prevailing power relations within a social structure (e.g. the capacity of financiers to leverage particular policy regimes in maintaining the value of currency against the interests of borrowers/anti-inflationary bias).  In the end, the fictitious character of the value of money is, precisely, the thing that it shares with all other commodities, for whom any theory of value amounts to a fiction, ratified by the (power-inflected) consent of market participants.  Whether we utilize a labor embodied theory of value or a marginal utility-based conception in the determination/validation of a commodity's value in exchange, we are telling a subjective, partial, and partisan story about how particular individuals in a particular context of exchange arrived at particular terms of the exchange, and the valuation of money, as the medium of such exchange, constitutes a part of the same story that must, consequently, be integrated into the larger account, however awkwardly.  The broader theme, therefore, in our Marxian tale of money and market exchange is consent/consensus on the valuation of money (commodity, fiat, or otherwise) and the valuation of commodities, whether or not the valuation of money formally corresponds to the valuation of all other goods and services and whether or not both processes in the determination of values are inflected by asymmetric power relations across a social structure.  In the end, the property of universal acceptance/validation in all market exchange transcends the limitations evident in Marx's prioritization of a labor embodied theory to establish the value of money and its consequent bias toward specie. 
          Universal acceptance of a monetary issue can either be constructed in a piece-wise manner from the ground up or it can be imposed from above by state fiat, where the state constitutes an indivisible sovereign, capable of dictating social regulations with the full force of its authority, if necessary through threat or practical exercise of coercive violence.  These alternatives are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  If the state is a democratic sovereign, then there is an implication of universal consent to the will of the majority, at least as an implicit condition of citizenship, even to the extent that such determinations reflect power asymmetries.  Piece-wise (networked) sanctification of a universal equivalent may itself operate as an implicit mechanism.  If enough participants in a market economy choose to accept a given universal equivalent, then there may be a tipping point at which all other participants are inclined or, minimally, compelled by practicality considerations to accept such an equivalent.  Beyond this, determination of the requisite qualities of such an equivalent, including its purity and the relationship of particular, divisible weights of the equivalent to other goods and services in the contexts of transactions, must incorporate universal acceptance among market participants.  Certain forms of universal equivalents with really good physical properties, like metals, might make this process easier, if only because they help cement supposed objectivity in the content and quality of the universal equivalent.
              The most obvious point of difference that would appear to exist between a monetary system that is strictly piece-wise (networked) and a state fiat system concerns the control of the aggregate money supply within the system.  How does the system control the creation, integration, removal, storage, and destruction of units of the money supply, contingent on the reality that regulation of the scale of the money supply in active utilization exerts real effects on the flow of commerce and the structure of prices?  In a true piece-wise system, a potential must exist for individual participants to alter the size of the money supply through unregulated activities (e.g. unlimited hoarding, integration of new, individually monopolized reserves).  In a piece-wise system constituted with a metallic money, say copper, the owner of a copper mine might possess the capacity to integrate large quantities of new copper money into the economy at will, thus, at least potentially leading to systemic price inflation.  Such a capacity explains why Keynes, in the Treatise on Money, makes the observation that "(t)o-day all civilised money is, beyond the possibility of dispute, chartalist," where chartalism is defined as the reduction of all legal money to state regulated money.  Effectively, there are no true piece-wise monetary systems in existence or at least worth examining in the world today.  In restating this observation, I would also include the possibility of block-chain money (e.g. bitcoin) within the spectrum of chartalist state (fiat) money, by the definition employed by Keynes.  The point here is not that block-chain monies do not constitute piece-wise, networked monies but that the structures of these networks are regulated to prevent individual participants from altering monetary conditions without the consent of all network participants.  In effect, block-chain systems constitute state fiat money systems, with centrally defined structural parameters, operating outside the Westphalian state system and its component state fiat money systems.  Block-chain is (democratic) state money absent a true political state.
             Approaching regulation of the money supply from the opposite standpoint, let us say that we have a state monetary system with a very different kind of political state from contemporary constitutional democratic systems.  Let us say we have an absolutist monarchical state in which the titular head claims all persons and possessions under the canopy of the heavens as his personal property and in which this head claims the ability to regulate all prices at which market transactions shall be conducted in monetary terms between his subjects.  All money is, thus, by definition, chartalist money, and the parameters within which money will be used exist to be regulated at the pleasure of the sovereign.  Better yet, let's give this sovereign a definite historical identity.  This is Qin Xi, the first emperor of the Chinese Qin dynasty, the first figure to claim the moniker "Son of Heaven," and one of human history's true megalomaniacs.  From his capital in Xianyang, Qin hears the constant flow of reports from the borderlands of the raids by the nomadic Hu (barbarian) people against his peasant subjects on the northern frontier with Mongolia, and he decides that it is time to make the Qin empire great again for his beleaguered subjects.  He is going to build a wall, a (G)reat wall.
           The problem is that his treasury isn't quite large enough to accommodate the expense of constructing a wall over a thousand miles in length, even where some preexisting segments remain from the building projects of local dynasties from the earlier Warring States period.  In his silver based monetary system, there aren't enough silver coins or silver bullion in the world of his time to pay for all the things Qin needs to build his wall.  Qin has to act decisively, so he decides to do something radical - he debases his currency.  Instead of having one hundred percent silver coins, coins will now be composed of twenty-five percent silver content, raising the money supply to four times its initial size.  At the same time he mandates that all prices across the empire must remain constant, and, to hammer home the point, he is ready to send his army out to discipline any of his subjects who dare to raise prices against his debased currency.  The problem with this solution is that the empire is quite large, stretching from the desolate lands on the borders of Inner Mongolia to the boundaries of present-day Vietnam, and Qin just doesn't have a large enough army to enforce his anti-inflationary edict at all places and at all times.
          In the prefecture seats and the local military outposts, the law is respected, but in small country hamlets and in little crossroad market towns people gradually come to understand that there is something different about the money in circulation.  As they do, prices start to creep upward outside the seats of monarchical and military power, and, as a consequence, the prefecture seats and the imperial capital begin to experience shortages of basic goods, as peasants try to hold onto more of their produce, demanding a higher price.  Predictably, Qin sends out the army into the countryside to discipline his disloyal subjects and seize produce, but, equally predictably, these actions produce localized insurrections and peasant uprisings.  Soon Qin is spending most of the time and resources that he wanted to commit to building his wall putting down local rebellions and seizing goods to feed starving townsfolk.  In the end, he never lives to see his wall finished, even if he somehow manages not to see his empire completely disintegrate beneath him.
          However much this account might possess a grain of historical truth, it no doubt substantially exaggerates the rigor of market forces in third century B.C.E. China and the unified national character of the Qin economy.  The moral of this more or less fictional account concerns neither the Confucian dictate that rulers should practice enlightened benevolence and piety toward their subjects nor the Monetarist hypothesis that peasants, when confronted with a manifestly debased currency, will exhibit adaptive expectations.  It is simply that no sovereign (or government acting in the interest of a sovereign), no matter how absolutist and totalitarian, can manipulate economic conditions at will without the implicit consent of the economy's participants.  Economies, market oriented or otherwise, are always piece-wise assemblages of individual actors, each possessing the capacity to cooperate or dissent from centralized regulations of economic conditions.  Even at the heights of totalitarian autocracy in the Stalinist Soviet Union, individuals still had the means to dissent from government efforts to mobilize their labor or appropriate the natural productivity of their land if at the expense of their freedom and/or their lives.  All economic processes incorporate networks in which all of the individual pieces must be made to work in order for a given outcome to obtain.     
         To make the point differently in reference to MMT, no government, acting in the interest of a sovereign, can print new money at will that is not backed by an increase in real economic productivity without expecting price inflation, and increases in real economic productivity will only happen if active economic agents apply their consent to the government's actions by altering the investments of their factors of production in such a way that raises aggregate supply.  Again, as argued above, this isn't a criticism of MMT or its defenders within the academic community as much as it is a warning to political figures who are presently bastardizing the theory.  The presence of an acute disjuncture between what MMT actually has to say about real economic activity and what the political left wants to extract from MMT becomes most clear in the cited podcast discussion with Stephanie Kelton when she cites testimony by, of all economists, Alan Greenspan before a U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Social Security funding and potential privatization.  Emphatically, Kelton uses Greenspan's testimony to make the point that government spending can summon real economic activity in existence if and only if factor resources exist to meet the increase in aggregate demand generated by the government's actions.  This is different than arguing that government spending axiomatically generates economic activity.
         The observation that governments cannot simply spend economic activity into existence by printing money at will places us squarely in the middle of the larger theoretic debate over monetary economy, real economic activity, and individual expectations.  Before laying out the broader terms of this debate, however, certain issues about the nature of money still need to be addressed relative to MMT. 

       Most notably, monetary sovereignty holds an important place in MMT.  Monetary sovereignty implies that the state, acting either strictly through its governmental capacity or through the workings of a (nominally) independent central bank, maintains full control over the money supply.  Only states that maintain monetary sovereignty can freely exercise an expansionary fiscal policy not otherwise backed by increased taxation for the stated reason that only states with monetary sovereignty can borrow funds in their own currency.  This idea needs to be broken down, in part, to emphasize the assumptions underlying the MMT argument.  For MMT, all currency is chartalist and, hence, derived from the state and, for fiduciary fiat money, backed exclusively by the trust of the state.  This statement glosses over complexities in the definition of the state, per se.  In contemporary liberal democracies, the state, as (undivided) sovereign, encompasses the entirety of the citizenry, and the government, as a conceptually separate, constitutionally sanctified and regulated entity, acts in the interests of the state.  Beyond this, control over the money supply and over monetary policy, generally, is often exercised by a central bank only tangentially related to the government.  It is, therefore, one thing to say that a state maintains monetary sovereignty and something different to say that a government exercises monetary sovereignty.
       In particular, in the United States, maintenance of control over the money supply is principally exercised through the Federal Reserve system, a nominally independent central bank established by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and acting in the interest of the state (i.e. the body of US citizens) with a mandate to control price inflation and facilitate economic growth.  The federal government of the United States exercises, at best, a peripheral influence on the actions of the Fed through appointment and approval of Federal Reserve governors and of the Federal Reserve Chair.  To the extent that the US Congress possesses enumerated authority, under Article I Section 8 of the US Constitution, to coin money and regulate its value, the maintenance of the broader monetary system in the US transcends the limited terms established by the Constitution.  The Federal Reserve Act, effectively, established a regulatory structure to control the creation of money by private banks, inclusive of the balances in demand/checking accounts.  Here, again, the money supply in the US is indisputably chartalist, but only a miniscule quantity of that supply is actually generated and controlled by the federal government (i.e. coinage).  The vast majority of the American money supply is Fed regulated bank money, including both Federal Reserve notes (US dollar paper money) and, under various definitions of the money supply,  account balances of diverse legal designations (demand/checking, timed/savings, etc).  The American state, as (undivided) sovereign, may be theoretically sovereign over this monetary system, in all of its components, but that sovereignty involves multiple distinct channels of authority with varying levels of public accountability.  With this basic institutional structure in mind, it would be a fundamental misnomer to argue, in MMT terms, that the US federal government can just print money into existence in order to enact an expansionary fiscal policy without raising taxes or borrowing - the federal government has no direct control over the number of US dollars in circulation. 

        Beyond the concerns raised above on the fragmentation of monetary sovereignty on a domestic level, still other qualifications on monetary sovereignty need to be acknowledged relative to the holding of monetary assets outside of the geopolitical boundaries of the state.  If the American populace remains theoretically sovereign over the supply of US dollars in circulation, then it further must encounter the obstacle that US dollars hold status as the default reserve currency in the global economy.  Foreign governments, central banks, businesses, and individuals maintain holdings of US dollars as a hedge against instability in other financial assets.  As such, some portion of the total dollars in circulation remains hoarded by parties outside of the jurisdiction of the American state.  To the extent that the American state, acting through the federal government and the Federal Reserve system, can only manage the supply of US dollars through the domestic mechanisms of monetary and fiscal policy, the sovereignty of the American state relative to foreign holdings of US dollars is strictly limited.  In the end, complete monetary sovereignty would demand the closure of an economy from all international capital and commodity flows and, hence, from the economic forces necessitating currency exchange and making external monetary hoarding possible. 

         In some measure, MMT advances from a vision of monetary sovereignty predicated on a unitary state with a closed economy, in which the government is indistinguishable from the sovereign and maintains full control over the creation, use, and destruction of all elements of the money supply.  It relies on the idea that the government, acting as sovereign, can always link its fiscal policy to the creation and regulation of the money supply, effectively eliminating any distinction between fiscal and monetary policy and prohibiting the possibility of leakages of the money supply outside the control  of the state. Such a situation is inconsistent with contemporary, globally connected market economies and with the existence of nominally independent monetary authorities, separating the formulation and execution of monetary policy from fiscal policy.

          If MMT effectively advances from this position on monetary sovereignty, then how useful is MMT in analyzing the connection between fiscal processes and the regulation of the money supply?  In particular, we can take MMT theorists at their word that the key issue involves the capacity of governments in states exercising monetary sovereignty to borrow in their own currencies.  If we do so, conceding that when the government borrows it is not creating money, then we must simultaneously step back, even minimally, from the MMT conclusion that fiscal spending creates money.  It is a small step from the robust MMT argument on fiscal spending to a concession that any deficit spending leads to crowding out.  We need to massage the larger point and purpose of the MMT argument on monetary sovereignty out of these specifications if MMT is to retain the most tangential rhetorical value.
        The issue for MMT concerns our capacity to interpret fiscal policy as the privileged driver for monetary policy in such a way that autonomous government expenditures induce increases in the money supply by the monetary authority.  If we are proceeding from the basic framework of the aggregate supply/aggregate demand analysis, the ISLM model, and consideration of the institutional responsibilities of central banks, then we may be able to specify a mechanism corresponding to this view.  

       If the federal government of the US enacts a budget spending $200 billion more than it is due to receive in tax revenues, then it be compelled to make up this difference through borrowing.  When it does so, upon the approval of Congress, the US Treasury will issue $200 billion in government securities.  The sale of these securities will draw some portion of the global supply of US dollars out of circulation.  Such a reduction in circulating dollars will, in some degree, place upward pressure on interest rates and, possibly, exchange rates relative to other currencies.  The logic of the ISLM model suggests that this upward pressure on interest rates will result in some level of "crowding out" of private capital investments.  Moreover, under roughly Keynesian assumptions concerning aggregate supply and aggregate demand, it should cause some modest increase in the aggregate price level, effectively lowering the real value of money in circulation and placing additional upward pressure on interest rates.  In this regard, the Federal Reserve, pursuing its dual mandate to promote economic growth and to control price inflation/ensure price stability, may decide to undertake open market purchases of government securities to counterbalance the contraction in the real value of circulating currency and reduce "crowding out" resulting from the substitution of public for private capital investments.  

       In effect, the Fed will "print" money in order to hold the real money supply relatively constant, inhibit increases in interest rates, and inhibit destabilizing aggregate price inflation.  Further, its actions would have been largely compelled by the fiscal operations of the federal government.  Conversely, if the government pursued an austerity driven effort to reduce budget deficits by increasing taxation, lowering quantities of discretionary money income available for both consumption and savings/investment, then, in the absence any expansionary open market initiatives by the Fed, the government's actions would, in effect, purposefully withdraw currency from circulation, slowing aggregate economic activity, by means of fiscal policy.  The MMT argument regarding monetary sovereignty and fiscal expenditure/taxation, thus, works if and only if monetary policy actions/inactions faithfully follow a complementary path in relation to any change in fiscal policy.  It would be as if the government printed its own money in order to spend it (or actively withdrew money in order to restrain economic activity) even if, in actuality, the government and the monetary authority exist as nominally independent entities.
        On the other hand, if the monetary authority displays a sufficient degree of independence in responding to large changes in fiscal policy, allowing interest rates to rise and fall at will with sizable increases and decreases in government expenditures or taxation, then we would ultimately have to discount the MMT proposition on the relevance of monetary sovereignty.  In the above example of US government spending, if the Fed did not adjust its open market operations to increase supplies of circulating US dollars, then, at least in theory, we would have to expect some level of crowding out.  Fewer dollars would be available for autonomous private sector capital investments and any available dollars would be more expensive to obtain.  In the end, we are still left with an autonomous increase in aggregate demand that is not balanced by a change in the money supply, resulting potentially in an inflationary destabilization of prices.
         The critical problem arising here involves a divergence between fiscal and monetary policy regimes where the government is leading with expenditure and taxation initiatives.  This situation implies that our imagery of the state as the unitary sovereign becomes, to some degree, schizophrenic in its exercise of monetary sovereignty.  With one hand, the state, through the government, is undertaking expansionary fiscal policy while, with the other, the state, through the monetary authority, is allowing the expansionary fiscal policy to destabilize prices and interest rates in a way that is apt to compromise the policy's effectiveness.
          There is neither a necessary reason why fiscal and monetary policy, advanced by divergent components of the state, should follow a complementary path nor is there any reason why the government should lead a complementary macroeconomic policy regime with expenditure and tax initiatives rather than following in the wake monetary policy initiatives by a central bank.  Fiscal and monetary policy initiatives may follow from divergent sets of motivations.  Government policymakers, informed by divergent short and long term electoral and/or bureaucratic interests, may, for example, come into office promising a laundry list of spending initiatives to diverse partisan constituencies.  At the same time, central bank policymakers, informed by diverse and contradictory theoretic perspectives on macroeconomic policy management and by close connections to financial sector actors (e.g. large banks, bondholders, fund managers), may seek to pursue a rigorous tight money policy to control price inflation and maintain a conservative macroeconomic growth trajectory.  The collision of these different sets of motivations, manifest as an incompatible set of monetary and fiscal policy regimes, thus, results in rising interest rates and crowding out of private economic activity.  

          These reflections aren't intended to cast blame on any of the components of the state.  All social agents, collective or individual, develop their own unique forms of knowledge and their own unique constellations of self interested relationships.  Moreover, it would be disingenuous to argue that any particular set of macroeconomic conditions should objectively convey itself to a particular set of monetary and fiscal policy regimes.  That is to say, it makes sense that each set of policymakers would pursue a set of policies corresponding to their immediate and/or longer term interests, those of their most closely associated stakeholders, and their own conceptions of what must constitute responsible policy management in relation to their legal/constitutional mandates, even if such an approach prevents coherence relative to other policymakers.  Central bankers must continuously ask how their management of the money supply and interest rates corresponds to their legal mandates, and politicians and government bureaucrats must continuously ask how their management of taxation and spending serves the public interest for which they were elected and/or appointed to maintain.  In this sense, MMT's imagery of a unitary state is simply lacking in recognition of competing interests across multiple distinct institutional environments, shaping and determining what might be contradictory monetary and fiscal policy regimes. 
            In further criticism of the MMT approach to monetary sovereignty, European Central Bank (ECB) figures have, similarly, stressed the problematic nature of monetary policy being led by fiscal policy.  The extent of this problem should be highly evident for the ECB and the Euro-zone national economies.  Governments in Euro-zone national economies can never lead with fiscal policy, if, for no other reason, then because the unified international nature of the ECB, as monetary authority, implies that coordination of fiscal and monetary policies would be virtually impossible without a single, overarching fiscal authority, directing a unified fiscal policy over all the Euro-zone economies.  Fiscal policy by Euro-zone governments, thus, limits itself to conciliation with the lead role of ECB monetary policy.  On the other hand, as most defenders of MMT have argued, the MMT conception of monetary sovereignty doesn't apply to Euro-zone national governments who cannot borrow in their own sovereign currencies.
          In concluding on the issue of monetary sovereignty and fiscal policy leadership, it is worth briefly asking what is at stake in conferring on government a lead role in macroeconomic policy management, one that would force the monetary authority to resign its independent station and conciliate money supply and interest rate management as if the government directly controlled these variables through fiscal policy.  Furthermore, assuming that MMT is on to something in stressing the finer points of its arguments on monetary sovereignty in relation to the capacity of the government to borrow in its own currency, it might be worth taking the argument in an entirely different direction from that embodied in the ideal of large monetary unions.  That is to say, if instead of pushing the argument in favor of a correspondence between fiscal and monetary institutions in such unions as the Euro-zone (i.e. a single overarching fiscal authority in Europe to match the single overarching monetary authority), wouldn't it make more sense to simply break up monetary zones into a multiplicity of independent monetary areas, each with fiscal and monetary authorities of corresponding scale.  In this respect, I do not even have the image of the pre-Euro national currency zones in mind, but, perhaps, something in even finer geographic detail.
         The first part of this larger conjecture gets, I believe, to one of the larger motivations of MMT and, certainly, to those of its progressive partisan backers.  Emphatically, if the government can effectively be brought into a superior station in the development of macroeconomic policy relative to central bankers, then the health of a national macroeconomy will become a preeminent subject of democratic deliberation rather than one of esoteric theoretic discourse and/or the maueverings of financial sector actors.  That is to say, MMT's backers, especially, seem to be attempting to place elected officials back in the driver's seat in managing the macroeconomy and compelling central bankers to assume a purely reflexive role.  Such a situation deserves some consideration and criticism, and I plan to do so subsequently.

       The second part of my conjecture, however, really gets to the heart of what I find potentially relevant about MMT and, in particular, the MMT argument on monetary sovereignty.  Among it's many functions to a market economy, money operates as suture, tying together disparate components of a market system to define its larger contours.  Going back to the initial comments in this section, money ties an economy together in ways that a pure barter system simply can't.  It enables participants in a market system to defy time and space in the accumulation and utilization of wealth.  In these terms, money defines the geo-spatial boundaries of an economy, national, transnational, or otherwise.  It establishes a currency zone as a particular and distinct entity, different from the political/legal/constitutional conception of the nation--state, a point well established with the experiment of the Euro.  The point that I want to make is that this non-correspondence between the nation--state and the currency zone could operate in multiple directions.

       The principle motivation of the Euro was to reduce transaction costs and other sources of friction between the European national economies, expanding the volume of trade between these economies.  There are myriad ways to achieve these ends without eliminating national currencies, especially at a time where real time information transmissions can express changes in exchange rates with ready precision.  More importantly, finite variation in currency valuations resulting from continuous fluctuations in commodity and capital flows between individual currency zones promote important feedback functions for individual regional economies.
         Intense international and/or interregional increases in demand for the goods and services generated by a particular regional economy manifest themselves in an increase in demand for the currency utilized by the exporting economy, lifting its exchange rates relative to other currencies.  This raises the price for the exporting economy's goods and services while simultaneously allowing the economy to afford an increase in imports, a counterbalancing dynamic that simultaneously provides direct feedback on the health of individual regional economies to the extent that the currency zone is sufficiently small to ensure proportionality in the conveyance of the feedback.  That is to say, if the currency zone incorporates too many distinct and substantially different regional economies, each displaying varying degrees of health in interregional trade, then there may be incongruities in the way feedback from exchange rate fluctuations are received - increases in exchange rates can stifle the efforts of struggling regional economies to generate viable export growth.  On a larger level, this lesson can precisely be extracted from the effects of European monetary integration on the weaker Southern European economies (e.g. Greece, Portugal, Italy).     
        If the operation of these exchange rate dynamics is manifest in the workings of commodity and capital markets between multiple national economies, then it would be true for multiple currency zones within a single national economy, each representing one or more regional economies.  In my opinion, it is worth asking, with the various pronouncements of MMT in mind, how larger national economies might benefit from the establishment of multiple currency zones, effectively disaggregating individual regional economies and subjecting them to more rigorous and direct monetary feedbacks.

         My argument here largely reiterates that of American urban/urban-economic thinker Jane Jacobs, who quite explicitly questioned the logic of a correspondence between the nation--state and (regional) macroeconomic systems.  This scepticism extended to the foundations of monetary economy.  Jacobs' criticism of monetary economics focused centrally on the determination of exchange rates, relative to the trading relations of individual urban regional economies, but MMT's theorization of the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy appeals to arguments also offered by Jacobs, mutually reinforcing the case for smaller monetary zones.  In particular, in the context of a critique of early Québécois sovereigntist proposals in the 1970s, Jacobs offers that plans for Québec to retain the Canadian dollar as its currency in the event of a formal political break between Québec and Canada would present Québec with self-defeating constraints on its capacity to undertake an independent fiscal policy (see Jane Jacobs, The Question of Separatism, 1980.).  In these terms, it is immediately evident that Jacobs grasped the theoretic underpinnings of MMT even if the approach had never been formally packaged in its current form.  In so many words, the Jacobsean argument is that complementary regimes of fiscal and monetary policy are more readily exercised in smaller monetary zones, and such zones will also maximize positive feedbacks from exchange rate fluctuations by minimizing incongruities between individual regional economies contained within the monetary zone.