4. The legal
parameters for marriage contracts are primarily matters for the
determination of general-purpose governments (states and, secondarily,
municipalities) – the U.S. Constitution neither confers authority on
Congress to regulate marriage contracts nor specifies any liberty of
individuals to enter into marriage contracts as defined by states.
Having stripped marriage
contracts down as far as I think is necessary to make a larger assessment of
what I think is at stake in U.S. Supreme Court adjudications over California’s
Proposition 8 and the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), I want to develop
my constitutional interpretation of the issues at stake in these two cases (Hollingsworth
v. Perry and United States v. Windsor). In the most basic terms, the business of defining marriage
resides at the level of general-purpose governments – succinctly, it is a
matter of determination for individual states. This has been a settled intra-state legal issue for much of U.S.
history. In key instances, however, the
U.S. judiciary has intervened in state-level determinations on the definition
of marriage to enforce particular provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
primarily associated under the rubric of substantive due process. Of critical importance, in this manner, was
the decision in Loving v. Virginia (388 U.S. 1 (1967)), which overturned
an anti-miscegenation law in the state of Virginia prohibiting interracial
marriage. The decision, preceded by
other rulings in federal and state judiciaries based on the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, constituted the basis for
invalidation of prohibitions on interracial marriage across the U.S.
As a matter of policy, I consider Loving to be a
landmark progressive turning point for marriage equality in the U.S. On the other hand, the decision does
something critically important, in my opinion, with negative consequences – it
makes the “freedom to marry” an unwritten protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment, inhering to individuals under the due process clause. The terms of this U.S. Constitutional
protection are broad enough to justify the terms of Goodridge v.
Massachusetts Department of Health (798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003)),
invalidating legal restrictions on same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, independently
of any provision of the Massachusetts state constitution utilized by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the issuance of its decision. Succinctly, if Loving holds as the
governing judicial precedence in Hollingsworth v. Perry, then the
potential exists for a blanket invalidation of every statutory and state
constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage in the U.S. As a negation of democratic processes,
embodied both in state legislative and referendum-based statutory and state
constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriages, such an invocation of
federal judicial authority against the states would be pernicious for several
reasons.
First, the U.S. Constitution is not stone – it is
plastic. What individual protections
federal judges and justices confer on individuals based on the Fourteenth
Amendment today, they can take away tomorrow if they deem such protections
inconsistent with the “intent of the founders” or with some new, unwritten
protections of the U.S. Constitution.
Fundamentally, no privileges or indemnities conferred on individuals or
citizens by un-elected adjudicators can ever be considered safe, if only
because such officials can never be brought to account for their
interpretations by the broader polity through a democratic electoral process. The only true safeguard of individual
liberties has to be the democratic process as the foundation against which
a polity is actually constituted as a self-governing collective
sovereign. It is one thing to oppose
prohibitions on interracial and same-sex marriage through mass campaigns,
rhetorically challenging statutory and state constitutional standards as inconsistent
with the fundamental rights of human beings and calling for their overthrow by
a legislature or through ballot referendum.
It is another thing to plead for nine men and women in black robes to
bind the hands of elected legislatures and the general public by invalidating
democratically enacted legal standards.
For these reasons, my affinity for decisions like Goodridge
is mixed. I am proud that my state
was among the first in the U.S. to recognize the legality of same-sex
marriages, but I would have rather had the chance to validate its legality
through the democratic process, especially through a referendum. Supporters of marriage equality, conversely,
like to make the argument that marriage rights should never be put to a vote,
because they are, by their very nature, human rights. In this regard, I would agree with them that
rights should never be put to a vote, but, on the other hand, if marriage was a
right, then it would not have to be put to a vote nor would it in any other way
constitute a policy question, because rights are absolute and inalienable. Marriage is not a right. It is a contractual union conferring
privileges and responsibilities on mutually consenting parties under terms
established by a government or the sovereign polity empowering the government
to act on its behalf. Marriage is a
liberty/permission conferred on individuals by the state at the will of the
sovereign. “Rights talk” is very often
a good rhetorical tool for groups seeking to advance some political agenda
(e.g. gun rights, animal rights, etc.), but the whole concept of a right is
socially atomistic, undermines the cultural processes through which a mass of
individuals see themselves as a society, and ultimately undermines the idea
that democracy is even possible – we can have rights or we can have democracy,
but it is really difficult to have both and, for my part, I will take
democracy.
I do not like California’s Proposition 8. I find the idea of selectively
discriminating against same-sex relationships in defining the legal terms of a
marriage contract as reprehensible as laws discriminating against interracial
relationships. Having made this point,
California voters decided, democratically, to enact such a restriction. California voters, like Maine voters in
2012, could, I am presuming, decide to democratically invalidate their
restriction on same-sex marriage. Under
present circumstances, the slim (52-48 percent) margin of victory for
proponents of Proposition 8 might flip in the opposite direction to restore the
legitimacy of marriage equality.
Perhaps I can afford to be biased because, as someone with heterosexual
preferences, no one has questioned my liberty to marry. I do not like the idea of allowing the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court, or any other instrument of the federal
judiciary to intervene in the democratic process in California or any other
state, even to the extent that the democratic process truncates certain
liberties of a discrete and persecuted minority. The only remedy to majoritarian discrimination that I understand,
in this regard, is to keep the democratic process open and to more aggressively
demand liberty and equality in the interest of the minority.
If
the Ninth Circuit Court’s opinion in Perry v. Brown (671 F.3d 1052 (9th
Circuit 2012)) is allowed to stand by the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth v.
Perry, then, I suspect, the incongruity of having same-sex marriages
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in California
but not in other states with statutory or constitutional prohibitions of
same-sex marriage will inevitably facilitate the judicial overthrow of every
prohibition of same-sex marriage in the U.S., however it was enacted, and,
in the process, give many more right-wing, states-rights cultural
conservatives one more reason to hate and despise the federal government for
violating their capacity for self-government. Based on initial comments from the oral arguments of Hollingsworth
v. Perry, this seems to be exactly what the Supreme Court is poised to do
by a 5-4 decision, if they deny the legal standing the non-governmental
proponents of Proposition 8 to argue on behalf of the state in defense of the
constitutional amendment and, thus, uphold the Perry v. Brown decision. Moreover, it would secondarily deprive
advocacy groups for particular government policies of standing to defend
particular policies that government officials have repudiated, even if they
have been democratically sanctioned. I
think that such a decision would not only be thoroughly un-democratic/anti-democratic
but also dangerous in its capacity to disempower partisan groups who may
seek a remedy to their disempowerment through violent means or otherwise incite
politically divisive relations between the federal government and individual
states.
In regard to the other constitutional question being
approached by the Supreme Court on marriage equality, it seems clear to me that
if, on the one hand, the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee a right to
marriage equality through the Fourteenth Amendment, then, on the other hand, it
nowhere authorizes Congress to say anything about the marriage
contract per se, outside of its liberty to act as a general purpose government
for U.S. territories and for the federal enclave of the District of
Columbia. Defining the terms of the
marriage contract is a business for individual states and the sole
responsibility for the federal government with regard to marriage is to ensure
its statutory enactments referencing marriage (e.g. income tax codes, Social
Security administrative procedures, etc.) do not conflict with the liberties
conferred by individual states on parties to a marriage contract. In this sense, if Massachusetts says that
two individuals are married, then the federal government has no business
whatsoever questioning the determination of Massachusetts that the two
individuals entering into a marriage contract were authorized to do so. Congress has no power under the U.S.
Constitution or the Social Security Act to tell the surviving spouse of a
deceased member of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts that she is not entitled
to receive Social Security survivor benefits that would be extended to the
surviving member of an opposite-sex marriage in Alabama – this amounts to an
unconstitutional usurpation of the authority of states to define marriage. This is precisely what Congress sought to do
under the Defense of Marriage Act, and the Supreme Court would be completely
justified in ruling that Congress had no authority to enact this law and,
hence, it is unconstitutional. I would
expect that the Court will do this by a 5-4 decision when it issues its opinion
in U.S. v. Windsor. In this
respect, the Supreme Court might end up, on the same day, ruling that states
lack the ability to define the terms of the marriage contract as their
sovereign polities see fit (in Hollingsworth v. Perry) and,
paradoxically, telling Congress that it lacks the same ability to define the
terms of the marriage contract (in U.S. v. Windsor). Presumably, if states cannot freely define
the marriage contract and Congress cannot define the marriage contract, then
the duty of defining the proper terms of a marriage contract must fall
wholly on the federal judiciary! This
would be unfortunate.
5. The origins of
the marriage contract reside in the organization and reservation of property
rights – in our time, we need to render unto the marriage contract what belongs
to marriage and render unto love what belongs to love.
Rounding off this rant, I
completely understand the pressure for social legitimation experienced by gay
couples, manifest in their demands for marriage equality, and they deserve
to be treated equally. Having
acknowledged this point, the stakes for marriage equality, fundamentally,
involve the distribution of property rights, not love or the legitimation of
love. Love is its own argument – it
requires nothing but itself and, truthfully expressed, demands acceptance from
no one. Marriage is not about
love – it is about the contractual distribution of rights to mutually held
property between two consenting adult individuals and has always been
thus, notwithstanding the rise of romantic love in Western civilization since
the Nineteenth century. Changes to the
distribution of property rights between individuals in a marriage
contract have certainly varied over time and place, but the overarching
principle is that a marriage defines a particular set of relations between a
set of individuals and the property that they mutually hold relative to other
individuals within a community.
Acknowledging my
limited abilities at pre-historical cultural anthropological
analysis/speculation, the marriage contract appears to, thus, emanate from the
earliest stages of the development of property rights – not individual property
but communal property, defined by the collective exclusion of a
particular set of means of subsistence to a particular group of
hunter/gatherer/foragers. If we accept
that pre-historical human culture begins with the migration of the human
species out of the East African Rift Valley, throughout Africa and then
throughout the Eastern Hemisphere some 125,000 years ago, then early
appropriations of property must have involved the portable tools of largely
nomadic, foot-bound bands of foragers, the discrete food supplies they shared
among themselves, and, perhaps, the “privileged” foraging sites/places around
which the bands focused their movements over extended periods of time. A wide range of roughly anthropological
accounts (e.g. Friedrich Engels’ “Origins of the Family, Private Property, and
the State,” Jane Jacobs’ (1973) speculation on the pre-historic origin of city
economies (the example of “New Obsidian”), Ryan and Jethá’s (2010) recent
account on promiscuity/polygamy in human physiological evolution) shapes my
approach to this period of human pre-history.
A novel interpretation of the origins of the marriage contract emerges
from the intersection of these accounts.
Proceeding from Ryan and Jethá’s argument that humanity evolves as a
promiscuous/polygamous species up to the dawn of sedentary agriculture
10,000 years ago, it seems likely that the nomadic/semi-nomadic
hunter/gatherer/forager bands that I am characterizing here would have
practiced polygamous sexuality, without any regard for more recent prohibitions
on incest and without any discernable notion of a marriage contract.
My
conclusion here mirrors that of Engels, reflecting on certain mid-Nineteenth
century anthropological accounts of Lewis Henry Morgan. For his part, Engels’ argues that
contemporary forms of monogamous marriage, replete with a restricted
nomenclature of familial relationship identifiers (e.g. one father, one mother,
brother, sister, uncle, etc.), arise from a larger evolution from fully
polygamous group marriage through more restricted conceptions of
marriage/familial relationships (i.e. gradual introduction of new categories of
incest prohibitions). Of course,
nothing is universal or continuous here – human history has all manner of
variation across cultures, between populations living even a few miles away
from each other and across a river or a mountain range. The key point here is that mechanisms exist
through which, in most cultural traditions, full sexual polygamy disappears and
is replaced by more restrictive sets of sexual relationships that may have
still included relatively polygamous relations but also began to define a
restricted notion of what constitutes a family through either a patrilineal or
a matrilineal hereditary line.
It
is my contention that the separating out of hereditary lines not only
facilitates the development of a concept of incest but also enables the larger
group to define separable familial claims to property relative to the communal
property of the larger group (and, eventually, after long historical progressions
in multifarious cultural contexts, full dissolutions of communal
property). The distinctions of
patrilineal and matrilineal descent become important here as a basis for
determining who is capable of exercising a claim on the property of a
given hereditary line. In diverse
cultural traditions reaching this particular stage in the separation of
communal property into transferable hereditary family property, we have the
origins of the marriage contract. At
the level of a semi-nomadic or fully sedentary group, the marriage contract has
the capacity to tie back together what the separation of hereditary lines has
ripped asunder in previous generations and will continue to rip asunder in
future generations. It also holds the
capacity to forge linkages between hereditary lines over geographically and/or
culturally longer distances, between larger groups (e.g. between distinct
semi-nomadic groups in relatively frequent contact).
To
be certain, the marriage contract at this stage (and, to a great extent, until
the Nineteenth century) has absolutely nothing to do with love. Rather, it has to do with an arranged
transfer of claims to hereditary property and assignment of privileges and
responsibilities in human reproduction processes (i.e. to generate progeny for
inheritance purposes) by familial/hereditary elders. If love figures somewhere here, it constitutes a residual
outcome of the arranged marital relationships formed, defined and characterized
by the mix of privileges and responsibilities of the marriage. In this regard, the marriage contract
defines the meaning of love rather than love defining the quality of a marriage
between two individuals, an inversion of the contemporary ideal order of
things.
Moreover,
from these pre-historic stages perhaps to the Nineteenth century (at least in
Western Judaic/Christian/Islamic-based cultural contexts), negotiation of the
marriage contract has nothing to do with equality between mutually
consenting partners and everything to do with the strategic imperatives of familial/clan
elders in maintaining the viability of a hereditary line in the distribution of
property claims. Furthermore, even in
circumstances where the male member of a heterosexual pairing may have
possessed some capacity to freely enter in to a marriage contract, the female
member is, until very recently legally/practically incapable of freely
contracting (and, moreover, absolutely incapable of holding or disposing of her
own property, before or after marriage).
The early pre-historical forms of the marriage contract may have been
wholly characterized by negotiation between third parties (e.g. familial/clan
elders from distinct semi-nomadic or sedentary groups) with the male and female
parties to the marriage having little or no liberty to contest decisions made
by the third party entrants to the contract.
Likewise,
the centrality of human reproductive processes to such pairings, evident in the
need to generate progeny for a lineage, implies, again, that the reproductive
capacities of male and female members constitute important commodities and
elements in the exchange of property claims, hence, the significance of
virginity, sterility, and adulterous violations of claims to the reproductive
capacity of a male or female. That is
to say, the negotiation of marriage contracts involves an exchange of property
in the reproductive capacity of individuals by familial/clan elders who
otherwise command the right to determine how the reproductive parts of their
progeny are to be used.
Several
things interest me in this line of speculative thinking about the pre-history
of marriage. First, to the extent that
marriage is about the transfer of property rights, the field of marriageable
individuals constitutes a kind of market. Of course, this is still true, as online dating companies
know. An interesting corollary to this
question concerns the processes and conditions through which pre-historic
marriage markets (i.e. between semi-nomadic and/or sedentary groups) might have
expanded across larger numbers of distinct groups. Herein resides my interest (as an urbanist) with the pre-historic
origin of cities (before sedentary agriculture) and Jacobs’ anthropological
speculations. Maybe the earliest of
cities were not only places where far flung trading networks between
hunter/gatherer/forager groups came together to trade goods and accumulate the
grains that would eventually fuel the development of agricultural cultivation –
maybe they were also places where hereditary lines crossed and elders from
distant places met to scatter their genetic material through the reproductive
capacity of their sons and daughters across the landscape. Further, assuming that polygyny (one male,
multiple female harems) appears at some point in many historical records
between polygamy and generalized monogamy, how would such a sexual organization
develop (i.e. what are its necessary and sufficient conditions?) and what
relationship might this have had to patrilineal or matrilineal hereditary
lines? Finally, apart from obvious ideological/religious
explanations on the development of matrilineal or patrilineal hereditary lines,
what role might the presence of a “gender surplus” in pre-historic groups (too
many females for an inadequate number of males or vice versa) have played in
establishing one organization of hereditary lines over another and what might
such origins suggest about the history of particular cultures? There may be research on any or all of these
issues, but they are questions that I have yet to fully investigate.
My
larger point here is simply to say that marriage, as a contractual institution,
predates any suggestion that love should be a motive for two individuals,
heterosexual or homosexual, to get married.
If there is an actual and robust linkage between marriage and human
reproduction over human history, moreover, I am still unconvinced that two
people require a marriage contract in order to be loving, nurturing
parents. Contemporary debates over
marriage equality raise important concerns about the organization of property
rights between individuals and the opportunities that individuals have to enjoy
the particular privileges connected with the marriage contract. These concerns are valid, and for that
reason I support marriage equality.
However, I think we need to firmly situate questions on marriage within
their appropriate legal contexts and, perhaps, ask whether we have demanded too
much of marriage as a socially stabilizing institution.
Evaluating,
again, recent records on the success and failure (divorce) of the marriage
contract in the U.S. (see “Marriage Rates by State: 1990, 1995, 1999-2011” at:
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/marriage_rates_90_95_99-11.pdf, and “Divorce Rates by State: 1990, 1995,
1999-2011” at: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/divorce_rates_90_95_99-11.pdf), divorces per thousand residents generally exceed
fifty percent of marriages per thousand households in most states from 1999 to
2011. It would seem that in an age
where ideals of individual freedom of choice and sexual equality resonate among
individuals across the U.S., it is becoming much harder to justify holding
together a marriage contract that no longer serves the needs of one or both
parties. No single reason exists for
the dismal state of the marriage contract in the contemporary U.S. Rather, the collective fate of marriage, as
an institution, is shaped by an infinitely large set of social processes that,
in the present moment, are combining to undermine the satisfaction that
individuals enjoy in the long run from uniting.
One
critically important set of processes determining the fate of marriage emanates
from the field of sexuality and, specifically, the psychological incongruity of
expansive polygamous sexual desires for stimulation with the requirement for
monogamous fidelity among partners. On
some level, such an incongruity must manifest itself in most failed marriages,
even if the precipitant cause of the breakup is financial strain,
geographically or professionally incompatible occupational paths, or some other
social or personal rationale. At its
root, I concur with the implicit conclusion advanced through Ryan and Jethá’s
account that the conception of marriage as a monogamous pair-bonding compact
operates against engrained physiological and psychological predispositions of
the human species, whether we are dealing with heterosexual or homosexual
individuals, male or female. As a
species, until the dawn of sedentary living, we evolved through promiscuous,
polygamous sexual relations.
Residual
manifestations of polygamous sexual desires concurrent to the widespread
institution of monogamous marriage might not be a problem within social
contexts marked by extreme forms of sexual repression, in which legal and
cultural/religious practices enforce extrinsic prohibitions on public
expressions of sexuality, reinforced by intrinsic/internalized psychological/emotional
reactions of guilt, perversion, and impropriety toward sexuality. Our problem is that we cannot reinforce such
repressive attitudes toward sexuality while concurrently utilizing sexual
desire as an interpersonal material component/input in marketing/commerce and
artistic (mass media, music, television, movies, Internet) expression. The enforced, jealousy-driven monogamy of
marriage feeds into the generation of a polygamous desiring personal psychological
underground (unconscious), manipulable as a symbolic reservoir for marketeers
to sell commodities and for artists to generate and convey sexually charged
messages. Is it any wonder why, faced
with diverse other non-sexual cultural and economic impediments, marriage is
having a hard time living up to its promises?
The
larger argument that I have attempted to present here seeks to suggest that, traditionally,
marriage has been a relatively unfree/coerced institution, inseparably linked
to human reproductive processes and their connections to social/hereditary
distributions of property rights, and relatively unrelated to the incidence of
love, as the development and nurturing of an emotional connection between two
individuals (which might, in some sense, develop between individuals drawn together
by some arranged contractual bond).
Over the last two centuries, we have grafted onto this institution of
marriage a greater degree of legal contractual liberty for individuals,
supported by an incessantly inflated ideal of romantic love as the primary
rationale for parties to enter into a marriage contract. In an age of largely reliable birth control,
this constellation of processes should no longer necessarily link human
reproduction and/or parenting to marriage.
If we remove this presumed linkage, then the argument advanced by
opponents of gay marriage that states have a legitimate reason to regulate the
marriage contract in support of the welfare of children must be, at least
partly, undermined.
I
would contend that states do need to address contemporary deficiencies of
parenthood in the U.S. but that the marriage contract is not a good medium for
doing so. We need to practically and
legally expand the concept of parenthood to incorporate a broader set of
relationships between children and biologically and non-biologically linked
mentors and parental surrogates on the principle that the more involved
nurturing figures that a child has in his life, the better, more
personally/emotionally mature and socially responsible adult he will become. I am not going to expand further on the idea
of legally transforming parenthood here, but I think that there are some
possible avenues for doing this, perhaps, through a reconsideration of the
legal relationships between students and educators in public and private
education. As a social bulwark in
parenting, marriage today is compromised by the sexually incongruities of
cultural processes that are contributing to the larger crisis of civil
marriage/high divorce rates.
Having
made this argument for separating parenthood and the responsibilities of the
state to protect the welfare of children from concerns with civil marriage, I
stand for the development of a post-marriage, post-monogamy, sex-positive
politics and culture. By this I do not
mean to argue that marriage needs to be abolished as an archaic institution
incompatible with contemporary human needs. The Bolsheviks, during the early 1920s, thought in these terms,
recognizing the marriage contract as an institution intimately related to
supporting the dominance of capitalism and the social oppression of women. To some degree, I concur with this view, but
it oversimplifies the problems and the positive potentialities of the
marriage contract (and, in any case, the abolition of marriage in Russia failed
– marriage was reinstated and strongly supported as an institution in Soviet
Russia from Stalin’s rise in the late 1920s to the system’s collapse).
The
marriage contract operates relatively well in organizing, merging, and
distributing property rights within a hereditary line. This is the most that I think we should
expect of marriage. It would be nice to
think that marriage, in some way, supports and nurtures the love that two
people have for one another, and, in certain ways, it almost certainly does. Insofar as this is the case, marriage may
constitute an environment favorable to the care and nurturing of children. On the other hand, marriage need not
do either of these things, and, in any case, no set of legal standards
can mandate and/or regulate, in a legally enforceable way, the love that
married partners have for each other or for their biological or adopted
children. Moreover, notwithstanding the
existence of legal prohibitions of adultery, no legal set of standards can
suture love and monogamous sexual practices through the device the marriage
contract. If the human species
manifests engrained physiological and/or psychological predispositions for
polygamous sexuality, then marital monogamy operates against human nature. That is not to say that married couples
cannot buck human nature and remain mutually faithful, but the ubiquity of sex
in contemporary culture (not only American cultural processes but Western
culture in general) makes this increasingly difficult and the state has no
business sticking its intrusive fingers either into the production and
distribution of sexually charged art and commercial communications or the
effects of its internalization in the lives of married couples.
With
all this in mind, it makes sense for states to rigorously define and rigorously
enforce what marriage means, as a species of civil contract, in a way that
conforms to the democratic will of their populations. It would be best, in this regard, if they
respected the liberty and equality of all individuals who wanted to legally
legitimize their relationship, regardless of the racial composition or the
sexual orientation of couples, and the demand for marriage equality is
everywhere a legitimate one. However,
the state can neither regulate the emotional content of a marital relationship
nor regulate the capacity or quality of a marriage as a social environment for
raising children, beyond the protection of children from verifiable parental
abuse and neglect. As in many other
circumstances, states necessarily lack the capacity to transform the
marriage contract into a functioning community within which love, mutual
respect, mutual care, and mutual equality can be developed and nurtured. If these virtues are going to be supported,
then we need a broader culture that will support the development of families,
irrespective of the marriage contract.
Such a culture would, moreover, recognize the contextual merits of
both sexual monogamy and polygamy, understanding that the contours of
loving relationships between individuals follow and shape heterogeneous sexual
practices over time. This conclusion
demands something approaching the concept of an “open marriage,” where casual
sexual explorations are accepted as a precondition of the viability of the
central relationship. It represents a
kind of balancing act between the evolving love of two marital partners and
their evolving sexual desires. This is
a path demanding a lot of courage and open-mindedness on the part of anyone who
would undertake to follow it, but it, likewise, seems to be the best way to
secure the idea of the family, as an essential building block of community, at
a time in which cultural forces are actively undermining marital monogamy.
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