Jon Lee Anderson of The New Yorker contributes a grim portrait on the current state of conflict in post-Qaddafi Libya (see Anderson, "The Unravelling: In a failing state, an anti-Islamist general mounts a decisive campaign,"The New Yorker (23 Feb 2015 Issue), at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/23/unravelling). In view of events this week, notably the execution near Tripoli of twenty-one Egyptian Coptic Christian contract workers at the hands of militants associated with the Islamic State (IS) and Egypt's military intervention against Islamist forces in Libya, the information in Anderson's article constitutes a relevant background on the disintegration of political order and the alignment of partisan forces in Libya, with international connections. Briefly, over the past two years, the country has effectively been split into eastern and western regimes, with a "House of Representatives" (HOR), composed in large part of liberal, pro-Western partisans and recognized by the U.N. and most of the international community as the legitimate government of the country, situated in Tobruk near the Egyptian border and a "General National Congress" (GNC), composed of an amalgam of divergent regional partisans affiliated, to some extent, with the Libyan "moderate" Salafist Muslim Brotherhood, in turn backed by Qatar and Turkey, situated in Tripoli. Militarily, the GNC has been most strongly associated with Libya Dawn, a partisan contingent associated with the Muslim Brotherhood uniting a number of western militias, most critically focused on the western city of Misrata, with a loose association to certain Islamist militias, like Ansar al-Shari'ah in Benghazi, the militia most directly responsible for the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi in September 2011 that killed U.S. Ambassador Stevens. On the other side, the HOR has been loosely associated with "Operation Dignity," a military contingent led by General Khalifa Haftar, a former commander in Qaddafi's military who, after spending nearly twenty years in the U.S. and gaining American citizenship, returned to Libya in 2011. In the tradition of great secularist Arab military tyrants with Western backing (e.g. Mubarak), Haftar's forces have been engaged in an effort to clear eastern Libya of Islamist forces, focusing first on Benghazi. Moreover, Haftar's Dignity forces have struggled against GNC-supported forces for control of Libya's hampered oil production and export complexes.
Critically, Anderson's article suggests that the current state of Libya has obtained thanks in large part to the unwillingness of Western governments to take a hands-on approach to the constitutional reshaping of Libyan government. As a result, Libya's post-Qaddafi governmental processes were shaped, to a great degree, by a tug-of-war between divergent factions in the Arab world, framed against the potential rise of the moderate Salafism of the Muslim Brotherhood and the reaction against Salafism. Egypt's post-coup, anti-Muslim Brotherhood regime has, thus, been a most enthusiastic supporter of Haftar's Operation Dignity. Its airstrikes against Islamist forces with connections to IS this week represent a logical extension of military-backed President al Sisi's current engagement with secularist, pro-Western partisans and their military backers in Libya. Similar motivations appear pertinent in UAE's support for Haftar and the HOR government. By contrast, the Saudi royal government appears to have supported Haftar and HOR simply out of a conservative, anti-democratic aversion to the political Salafism, as a potential threat to the continuity of royal governance in the Saudi kingdom. On the other side, Qatar and Turkey's AKP government, with its strong connections to the Muslim Brotherhood and moderate Salafism, per se, have strongly supported the GNC and Libya Dawn. Beyond the initial NATO military intervention against the Qaddafi military, neither the U.S. nor any EU states have strongly intervened in the process of state-building.
A lack of success by political Salafists in early post-revolutionary elections were counter-balanced by recourse to arms through the continued ready access to militia contingents in Tripoli, Benghazi, and other cities after the meltdown of the Qaddafi military and security forces. The Muslim Brotherhood was apparently able to secure agreement from the GNC to make Shari'ah the basis for all legal and jurisprudential principles in December 2013 thanks in large part to the intervention of Misrati militias in Tripoli. In view of such circumstances, the only available means at the disposal of liberal, pro-Western factions to enact legal and constitutional barriers to Islamist rule involved securing superior military support and fighting it out with the Salafists. Again, the experience of Libya today may convey a broader message on the incapacity of political Salafists, operating at least nominally on a democratic basis, to participate with secular liberal opponents in a way that will respect the boundaries between spiritual/ecclesiastical and governmental matters (maybe the experience of Tunisia conveys otherwise, however!). Furthermore, if "moderate" Salafists in Libya have enjoyed their most substantial gains not through the democractic process but from alliances with divergent militias, then it stands to reason that they may have more to gain from the potential base of attraction for foreign fighters generated in the exportation of the IS "brand" from Syria and Iraq to Libya. However much the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood and their Libya Dawn allies may be opportunistic in regard to their willingness to countenance the rise of militant Salafism in its conflict with liberal, pro-Western supporters, it seems unlikely that the moderates will be able to contain the unintended consequences of their actions if either IS or al Qaeda of the Islamic Mahgreb militants from Libya strike out against the West and invite a significant military intervention against their country.
Unfortunately, it seems that the West is facing yet another tough set of choices in regard to our engagement with a particular corner of the Arab world. Libya needs to be stabilized. If there is a valid potential for democracy to take root here, and even a preference for liberals over Salafists, then the U.S. and EU need to act more aggressively to enable a victory for the pro-Western side. In these terms, Haftar might presently be our best hope for a Libya that the West can actually deal with in combatting militant Salafist Jihadis and disarming the wide array of allied militias associated with Libya Dawn. On the other hand, we have to recognize the problematic possibility that, in supporting a Haftar, we will end up with a Mubarak, who suppresses political liberties and enflames Salafists. The only certain thing that I would argue at this moment is that we cannot afford to do nothing as IS constructs a base outside of Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the much cited reality that Libya is becoming a hub for economic migrants and political refugees fleeing the Mahgreb, Sudan, and sub-Saharan Africa for the EU through Italy means that the lack of governmental control in Libya is making it a potential medium for Salafist militants to find their way into Europe to commit violence. Libya has to be dealt with by the U.S. and EU, and the faster we do so, the less costly it is likely to be.
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